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Thesis Abstract 
Name: Ahmad Salam Abdullatif Alrefai 
Title: BGP based Solution for International ISP Blocking 
Major Field: Computer Engineering 
Date of Degree: December 2009 
The problem that this thesis tackles is finding and evaluating a counter measure to 
the malicious Internet blocking of a local region by International Internet Service 
Providers (IISP) that blackhole traffic destined to or originated from the local region 
while advertising paths to destinations. The thesis only considers solutions that are 
based on Border Gateway Protocol. The major contributions of this thesis are three fold. 
The first one is the proposal of three BGP based solutions; namely BGP tuning, virtual 
peering, and virtual transit. While the control of outgoing traffic using BGP tuning is done 
by setting the value of local preference, the control of the incoming traffic can be done 
using AS-Path shortening, advertising more specific prefixes, or using community 
techniques. The second contribution is the implementation of the problem model and 
BGP tuning based solutions in OPNET. The third contribution is the performance 
evaluation of the BGP tuning solutions in terms of packet drop, convergence time, 
throughput, and application specific measurements.  
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 اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﻠﺨﺺ
  
  ﻲﻒ اﻟﺮﻓﺎﻋـﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻠﻄﻴﺑﻦ ﻼم ــﺪ ﺳـاﺣﻤ: ﺳـــــــــــــــــﻢاﻻ
  ﻣﻦ ﻣﺰود اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﺤﺠﺐﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ اﻟ( PGB) ﺤﺪوداﻟ ﺑﻮاﺑﺔﺣﻞ ﻳﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺮوﺗﻮآﻮل : ﻋﻨﻮان اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ
  هﻨﺪﺳـﺔ اﻟﺤﺎﺳـﺐ اﻵﻟـﻲ: اﻟﺘﺨﺼﺺ
  9002، (آﺎﻧﻮن اﻷول)دﻳﺴﻤﺒﺮ : ﺗﺎرﻳﺦ اﻟﺘﺨﺮج
ﻳﺴﻘﻂ .  ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒﻞ ﻣﺰود دوﻟﻲ ﺧﺒﻴﺚ ﻟﻼﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻨﻄﻘﺔ ﻣﺤﻠﻴﺔﻋﻦ اﻻﻧﺘﺮﻧﺖ  ﻳﺠﺎد ﺣﻞ ﻟﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ ﺣﺠﺐﻹ اﻷﻃﺮوﺣﺔﻩ هﺬ ﺗﻬﺪف
اﻟﻤﻨﻄﻘﺔ اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﺔ ﻣﻊ ﻗﻴﺎﻣﻪ ﺑﺎﻻﻋﻼن ﻋﻦ ﻗﺪرﺗﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ إﻳﺼﺎل ﺗﻠﻚ ﻣﻦ  ﺼﺎدرةاﻟﻤﺘﺠﻬﺔ إﻟﻰ أو اﻟﻧﻴﺔ واﻟﻜﺘﺮ اﻟﺤﺰم هﺬا اﻟﻤﺰود اﻟﺨﺒﻴﺚ
ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻣﺴﺎهﻤﺎت  وﺗﻘﺪم اﻷﻃﺮوﺣﺔ(. PGB)ﺑﻮاﺑﺔ اﻟﺤﺪود اﻟﺤﻠﻮل اﻟﻤﻌﺘﻤﺪة ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺮوﺗﻮآﻮل  ﺗﺪرس اﻷﻃﺮوﺣﺔ. اﻟﺤﺰم إﻟﻰ أﻣﺎآﻨﻬﺎ
 (PGB) اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ هﻲ اﻗﺘﺮاح ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﺣﻠﻮل ﻣﻌﺘﻤﺪة ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﺮوﺗﻮآﻮل ﺑﻮاﺑﺔ اﻟﺤﺪود وهﻲ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﻒ اﻟﺒﺮوﺗﻮآﻮل. رﺋﻴﺴﻴﺔ
ﻟﻠﺘﺤﻜﻢ  ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻗﻴﻤﺔ ﺗﻔﻀﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺤﻠﻴﺔ ،(PGB)ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺗﻮﻟﻴﻒ اﻟـﺒﺮوﺗﻮآﻮل  .واﻟﺘﻨﺎﻇﺮ اﻻﻓﺘﺮاﺿﻲ واﻟﻌﺎﺑﺮ اﻻﻓﺘﺮاﺿﻲ
اﻟﺼﺎدرة، وأﻳﻀًﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﻧﻔﺲ اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﻃﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﺗﻘﺼﻴﺮ اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻖ، أو إﻋﻼن ﺑﺎدﺋﺎت  اﻟﻤﺮور ﻟﻠﺤﺰمﺑﺤﺮآﺔ 
ج ﻟﻠﻤﺸﻜﻠﺔ وﺣﻠﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻴﺔ هﻲ ﺑﻨﺎء ﻧﻤﻮذ. ﻟﻠﺤﺰم اﻟﻮاردةﻟﻠﺘﺤﻜﻢ ﺑﺤﺮآﺔ اﻟﻤﺮور  أآﺜﺮ ﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪًا، أو اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺗﻘﻨﻴﺎت اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ
اﻟﻤﺴﺎهﻤﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ هﻲ ﺗﻘﻴﻴﻢ أداء هﺬﻩ (. TENPO)ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ اﻟـ ( PGB)ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﻳﻖ ﺗﻮﻟﻴﻒ ﺑﺮوﺗﻮآﻮل ﺑﻮاﺑﺔ اﻟﺤﺪود 
  . ﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﺑﺘﻄﺒﻴﻘﺎت ﻣﺤﺪدةاﻟ ﺴﻘﻄﺔ، وﻗﺖ اﻟﺘﻘﺎرب، واﻻﻧﺘﺎﺟﻴﺔ، ﺑﺎﻹﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ اﻟﻘﻴﺎﺳﺎتاﻟﺘﻘﻨﻴﺎت ﻣﻦ ﺣﻴﺚ اﻟﺤﺰم اﻟﻤ
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is one of the most important means to communicate with others, and to 
obtain or to provide services. The number of people using the Internet in March 2009 
exceeded 1.5 billion users which constitutes about one quarter of the whole population 
in the world [1].  Enhancing the resiliency, availability, and security of the Internet is one 
of the major requirements for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and for Internet users 
who benefit from its services. If the Internet is unavailable, then the user will not be able 
to access services during the unavailability time. If it is not resilient or not secure then, in 
the presence of any problem such as Internet blockage or attack, the access to the 
Internet will be denied and the user will not be able to get to the subscribed services.  
There are several causes of Internet outage. For example, Internet outage may occur 
due to malicious attacks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Also, it 
might be due to software or hardware failure, or misconfiguration of routers. Link cuts 
can also cause Internet unavailability. International Internet Service Providers (IISPs) 
have the capability to deny Internet for specific regions. This can be done either at the 
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application level or at the routing level [2]. This problem arises because, in this case, 
some services of the Internet will not be available due to intentional and malicious act of 
IISPs. Accessing the Internet even when the IISP is denying the service must be a concern 
for Regional Internet Service Providers (RISPs) who want to provide resilient Internet 
access for their subscribers. 
1.2 MOTIVATION 
Since network security and availability are of major concern for Saudi Arabia, it 
should not completely depend on one International ISP to get access to the Internet. So 
resiliency of the Internet is a must for the local ISP. Therefore, the potential for 
International ISPs to block access to the Internet maliciously must be investigated and 
counter measures must be proposed. This work will enable us to better understand the 
BGP weaknesses and provide higher Internet availability for the region. 
1.3 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION 
Local ISPs which provide Internet reachability for their customers are getting the 
Internet access through IISPs. These IISPs are paid in a customer-provider relationship in 
order to provide Internet access. The IISPs can make use of the routing protocol they run 
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in order to maliciously block access to some services. These IISPs can also claim that they 
have a route to destinations inside the local region while blackholing the traffic destined 
to the prefix owned by the local region. Therefore, a malicious IISP can be defined as a 
provider that advertises a prefix of a local region and advertises Internet prefixes to the 
local region, while blackholing the traffic of the local region to the Internet and 
blackholing the traffic coming from the Internet to the local region. Figure  1-1 depicts 
the described scenario. This thesis focuses on finding a solution to bypass the malicious 
IISP despite its false advertisements. While the blockage detection is not part of this 
work, however it is simple to detect and implement [3]. This can be done by 
implementing a traceroute-like technique to identify that the traffic stops at the 
malicious IISP [3].  
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Figure  1-1 Malicious IISP blocking. 
Two major approaches exist to solve the problem. One approach is to hide one’s 
identity by using NATing, tunneling, etc. Another approach is to have more than one IISP, 
i.e. multihoming, and control the traffic either by using an overlay protocol, fine tuning, 
or modifying the BGP protocol to perform traffic engineering. The latter approach is used 
to direct the outgoing and incoming traffic so that they do not pass through the 
malicious IISP. Figure  1-2 and Figure  1-3 illustrate these approaches. We will concentrate 
in this thesis on the BGP based solutions and not on NATing or pure tunneling. It should 
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be noted that if the IISP is only denying service access without false advertisements with 
the intention to blackhole legitimate traffic, then the existence of another IISP that is not 
denying the access will solve the problem. This is because all incoming and outgoing 
traffic will pass through the other IISP since it is the only provider that advertises the 
prefixes of the local region and a BGP session can be established with it alone. A solution 
needs to be investigated if the IISP is advertising the prefix of a specific region to the 
Internet and/or advertising Internet prefixes to this region while blackholing traffic 
coming to the local region from the Internet and/or traffic going from this region to the 
Internet.  
In Figure  1-2, the local ISP may be supported by a cooperating neighboring router to 
set up a tunnel, or to use the path through a neighbor while changing the source address 
(NATing) in order to send traffic to destination. In the same way, the destination should 
direct its traffic through the cooperating neighboring router.  
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Figure  1-2 Identity hiding techniques. 
Figure  1-3 depicts traffic engineering approaches that focus on directing the traffic, 
both incoming and outgoing, through the good or non-malicious IISP. This may be 
performed through configurations of the BGP protocol, and may also be done through 
some cooperative algorithms [4].   
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Figure  1-3 Traffic engineering based techniques. 
1.4 SCOPE 
Simulation is used for testing the validity of the solution. We do not consider 
deploying a real experiment on the Internet. We focus in our research how to direct the 
traffic rather than how to detect whether there is a blockage or not. Since we will not 
focus on hiding one’s identity, we will not consider the case when the path of the traffic 
must pass through the blocking ISP, although we propose techniques on how to tackle 
this issue. 
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1.5 ASSUMPTIONS 
1. We assume that we will be able to add another International ISP as part of the 
solution. 
2. We assume that only one of the ISPs is blocking the Internet access. 
3. We assume that we know apriori which ISP is blocking.  
1.6 LIMITATIONS 
One limitation is that, if the traffic need to pass through the malicious International 
ISP, then the traffic might be filtered. Another limitation is that the control generally of 
incoming traffic is usually undeterministic which means that we do not have assurance 
that the traffic will go where intended. In addition, deterministic control of traffic 
requires communication with those who are going to forward traffic to us [4]. 
1.7 THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized as follow. In  CHAPTER 1, we provide formal description of the 
problem, its scope, the limitations and the focus of the research. In  CHAPTER 2, we 
provide the basic background knowledge to understand the rest of the thesis where the 
P a g e  | 9 
 
 
Internet and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) are introduced. If the reader has this 
background he can safely skip  CHAPTER 2. In  CHAPTER 3, a literature survey of related 
work is presented. The reader does not need to go through the literature survey to 
understand the work, but reading the literature survey will allow the reader to look at 
different angles and areas investigated in the past. In  CHAPTER 4, we propose three 
major BGP based techniques to solve the problem. The techniques are BGP tuning, 
virtual peering, and virtual transit. BGP tuning includes a set of techniques to control the 
incoming traffic, namely, community, shortening, and more specific prefixes and to 
control the outgoing traffic by the setting local-preference attribute. These techniques 
are qualitatively analyzed and compared with each other.  In  CHAPTER 5, we describe 
the design, implementation, and validation of BGP tuning techniques in OPNET. 
In  CHAPTER 6, a performance evaluation of BGP tuning techniques is presented. The 
techniques are studied for different configurations to test the packet drop, convergence 
time, throughput, and application specific packets sent and received. In  CHAPTER 7, a 
conclusion and future direction for the thesis are presented. The appendices show the 
code modification in OPNET and instructions on how to run the code and the simulation. 
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1.8 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the problem is defined and possible ways of solving it are presented. 
The concentration of the work of the thesis is declared. The scope, assumptions, and 
limitations are noted. Finally, the chapter presents the organization of the thesis.   
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 INTERNET 
Internet is a large network consisting of a very large number of smaller networks. 
Nodes and links are the main components of networks. Nodes can either be end systems 
or hosts and intermediate systems or routers. Different types of links exist; one can refer 
to [5] to know more about Internet connections and links.   Information travels from a 
source to a destination through a series of nodes called path. Routing Protocols select 
the path through which information travels and it does that by exchanging reachability 
information between nodes. Reachability Information is the information that enables 
routers to know where other hosts and routers are.  
Networks are managed by ISPs that can be classified into tiers depending on the size 
of the networks the ISP operates. Tier 1 ISPs often have global backbone networks while 
tier 2 ISPs have regional wide networks. Tier 3 ISPs normally provide Internet access to 
end users [6].  A network that is administered by a single organization is called an 
Autonomous System (AS). The Internet is composed of a large number of Autonomous 
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Systems (ASes). Figure  2-1 depicts a general overview of the Internet. Each cloud in 
Figure  2-1 represents an AS. 
 
Figure  2-1 Overview of the Internet. 
A transit network is a network that delivers traffic from one network to another, 
whereas, a stub network is a network that does not work as a transit network. The stub 
network only carries traffic if it is either a source or a destination of that traffic. The 
relationship between routers in the Internet is either peer-to-peer where routers 
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exchange traffic in one to one relationship without money involvement, or customer-
provider where the customer pays money for the provider for connectivity to the 
Internet. A multihomed customer is one that has more than one provider that it is 
connected to. 
The fundamental authority of all IP addresses is the Internet Assigned Number 
Authority (IANA) [6]. Initially when the Internet was not big, organizations apply directly 
to IANA. In 1993, the US Department of Commerce chose the Internet Corporation of 
Assigned Numbers (ICANN) for administration of IP address Space [7]. Four Regional 
Internet Registries (RIRs) are created to allocate addresses for particular regions. The 
American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) is responsible for administrating the 
delegation of IP address space in North America. Most of the address space allocation in 
Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa is delegated by the Réseaux IP Européens 
(RIPE).  Asia-Pasific Network Information Center (APNIC), as its name suggests delegates 
IP addresses in Asia and the Pacific region. Finally, Latin American and Caribbean 
Internet Address Registry (LACTIC) delegates addresses to the corresponding region. 
Figure  2-2 shows a sample of address delegation in the Internet [7]. 
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Figure  2-2 Sample of Address Space Delegation [7] 
ISPs, in general, delegate address space to their customers, i.e., organizations’ and 
enterprises [7]. It is difficult to know which ISPs delegated which IP prefix to which 
organization since we have a huge number of IP prefixes (more than 180000) and there 
is no rule that controls delegation of IP addresses [6].  
Contractual agreements or Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are defined between 
ISPs and their clients to determine the quality of service that must be provided. BGP 
allows one to filter received routes from other peers and to filter advertisements to 
them; also it might select routes based on specific conditions. BGP succeeded to be a 
“policy-based inter-domain routing protocol.” [7] 
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Within each AS, routers run an Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) such as the Routing 
Information Protocol (RIP) or the Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) protocol. On the other 
hand, for communication between ASes, routers run an Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) 
such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). 
There are two main types of routing protocols; namely, distance vector and link 
state. In a distance vector protocol, a routing table is retained and this routing table is 
made up of a set of vectors that correspond to a specific destination in a network. 
Occasionally, nodes advertise their routing tables to their direct neighbors who update 
their routing table based on some distance metric and the advertisements they receive. 
RIP is an example of a distance vector protocol. In the link state protocol, each node 
floods Link State Advertisement (LSA) – which contains a link identifier, its state, and its 
neighbors – to every other node in the network. All nodes builds an exact link state 
database and run a common algorithm (Dijkstra’s) to compute the shortest path 
according to some cost. Examples of such routing protocols include OSPF and 
Intermediate System protocol (IS-IS). 
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2.2 BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL 
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) defined in RFC 4271 [8] is the de facto standard 
for routing in the Internet. BGP is a path vector protocol which is based on a distance 
vector approach. While a simple distance vector protocol, such as RIP, has a simple 
metric coupled to it, BGP utilizes many attributes and enables the selection of the best 
route based on a local policy. Attributes include the Local-Pref which enables the ISP 
administrator to set which route it prefers for a specific destination, and the AS-PATH 
which is a sequence of AS numbers defining a route. BGP is used by ASes to determine 
how to route traffic to other ASes. Thus, the main function of BGP is the exchange of 
Network Reachability Information (NRI) between BGP systems. This information includes 
a set of ASes which is sufficient for building a graph of ASes in order to reach a 
destination.  In this case, a BGP speaker, which is a router that runs the BGP protocol, 
can eliminate routing loops by deleting a repeated AS number in the path and enforcing 
routing policies.  BGP uses a destination-based forwarding paradigm where the router’s 
decision to forward a packet is only based on the destination address. So, BGP supports 
only policies that obey the rules of this forwarding paradigm, meaning that in order to 
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construct a policy it should be based only on the destination address. In order to have a 
reliable communication for BGP, BGP runs over the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP).  
BGP defines a number of rules that help in selecting the best route. The first rule is to 
take the route with a higher degree of preference that is usually set by the Local-
pref attribute. If more than one route has the same local preference, BGP will look for 
the shortest AS_Path. If they are the same, BGP will look for the lowest 
Multi_Exit_Disc (MED) value if they have the same Next_Hop value. Then, if a 
decision cannot be taken, the path with the lowest cost to the Next_Hop of the route is 
selected. Finally, the route with the lowest BGP identifier is chosen if more than one 
route is still present. [6] 
BGP, in its basic implementation, provides no protection and security and that makes 
it vulnerable to many attacks [9].  There are three main drawbacks of BGP. The first one 
is that BGP does not check that the message is not modified (Integrity). Also, it does not 
make sure that the message is new or not replayed (freshness). Moreover, it does not 
verify that the originator of the message is a legitimate one (origin authentication). 
Second, BGP does not check the authority of announcing an AS-Path by a specific 
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Autonomous System. Finally, the genuineness of path attributes announced by a specific 
AS is not checked in BGP. [7,9] 
In order for BGP to function, four basic messages are exchanged. A KEEPALIVE 
message may be sent regularly to ensure a live connection. A NOTIFICATION message is 
sent in case of errors or special conditions and then the connection is closed.  An 
UPDATE message is used to advertise routes, which contains a set of destination and 
path attributes. More than one route can be advertised in a single UPDATE message by 
including more than one prefix in the network layer reachability information (NLRI) field 
in the UPDATE message. In case a previously advertised route is no longer available for 
use, a BGP speaker can inform its peers by advertising this route in the WITHDRAWN 
ROUTES field of the UPDATE message, or in a replacement route of the NLRI, or closing 
the connection to remove all routes. [8] 
Figure  2-3 shows a schematic of the finite state machine implemented by BGP. 
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Figure  2-3 Border Gateway Protocol Finite State Machine 
This diagram depicts the most important events that cause a change to the next 
states. Error events or unexpected messages usually lead to going to the Idle State after 
freeing all resources [these are not shown in Figure  2-3 for clarity]. The most important 
state is the ‘ESTABLISHED’ state where update messages can be exchanged between 
peers. Each peer connection is initially in the ‘IDLE’ state. When it receives manual or 
automatic start it goes to the ‘CONNECT’ state after initializing resources and starting 
TCP session with peers. If the start signal comes with a passive TCP establishment, this 
means to wait for the other peer to start a TCP connection, then it goes to the active 
state. If the ConnectRetry_Timer event happens, which is used to control the time 
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to retry the connection, and then it is restarted and stays in the ‘Connect’ state. If TCP 
connection fails the system goes to the ‘ACTIVE’ state where it waits for a connection. 
Whether we are in the ‘CONNECT’ or ‘ACTIVE’ states, if TCP succeed or 
DelayOpenTimer_Expires [which is event waiting for the other side to start 
opening the session], the system sends an ‘Open’ message, to open a BGP session, and 
goes to ‘OPEN SENT’ message. If the system is in the ‘CONNECT’ or ‘ACTIVE’ and it 
received Open message, it sends ‘Open’ message and then a ‘KeepAlive’ message and 
goes to the ‘OPENCONFIRM’ state. If the system is in ‘OPENSENT’ state and it receives an 
‘Open’ message, it sends a ‘KeepAlive’ message and goes to the ‘OpenConfirm’ 
state. If the peer receives a ‘KeepAlive’ from the other side it goes to the ‘Established’ 
state where a ‘KeepAlive’ and ‘Update’ messages are interchanged. If ‘KeepAlive’ 
message is received we restart the ‘HoldTime’ timer. If 
KeepAliveTimer_Expired event occurs the BGP speaker resend a ‘KeepAlive’ 
message and restart the timer. If an ‘Update’ message is received, the ‘Update’ is 
processed and the HoldTime Timer is restarted. In the case when the ‘HoldTime’ 
timer expires, the router sends a ‘Notification’ message and changes the state to 
IDLE.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we survey the literature related to our work. Since BGP is the main 
concern of our work, we initially look at some of the main BGP RFCs. Then, we present 
the BGP multihoming issue, because in our solution, we will consider that the local 
region is connected to more than one provider (multihoming). After that, we survey the 
issue of BGP threats and attacks to determine what the weak points of BGP that might 
be considered are. This is followed by a survey about BGP security techniques. The 
Multiple Origin Autonomous System (MOAS) conflict is then looked at, since it is used in 
some prefix hijacking detection systems which we discuss in the section that follows. We 
consider prefix hijacking because in our problem the ISP is ‘hijacking’ or advertising the 
local region’s prefix and then blackholing the traffic. In the following section we discuss 
BGP misconfiguration which could have the same effect as BGP Attacks and MOAS. In 
order to control traffic, we can either have an overlay protocol or utilize traffic 
engineering and modify an existing protocol (BGP). The two sections that follow discuss 
each one of them. BGP simulation tools are then investigated. Then, we present an 
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overview of a paper that describes the behavior of BGP under stress. Finally, a summary 
of a paper that analysis BGP convergence time is presented. 
3.2 BGP RFCS 
There are some of Request for Comments (RFCs) that describe BGP. The main one is 
RFC 4271 which includes the details of the protocol [8]. This RFC obsoletes the old 
description about the protocol in RFC 1771 [10]. BGP Security Vulnerability Analysis (RFC 
4272) presents some security related topics with BGP, and lists the drawbacks of BGP 
protocol because it does not have a protection against modification, addition, or 
deletion of BGP messages [9]. RFC 2439 describe ways used to dampen a misbehaving 
route in BGP [11].  
3.3 BGP MULTIHOMING 
Liu X and Xiao L. surveyed the current research in multihomed stub networks [12]. 
They presented the two major multihoming technologies: BGP Multihoming and NAT 
Multihoming. BGP multihoming means that the internal router contributes to the overall 
BGP system, and is connected to more than one external BGP speaker. NAT Multihoming 
means that the local autonomous system has a server between it and multiple providers. 
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A non-aggregation problem is the problem of not being able to aggregate prefixes with 
each other because they are neither contiguous nor overlapping. NAT multihoming can 
easily avoid this problem, since it can easily translate addresses into addresses that 
belong to the provider prefixes so that the provider can aggregate them with its prefixes. 
BGP multihoming guarantees the uniqueness of IP addresses and is able to control the 
routing policy.  
3.4 BGP THREATS & ATTACKS 
Nordstrom and Dovrolis [13] discussed the types of BGP attacks and pointed out four 
main goals of BGP attacks. The first goal is blackholing, which is to drop the traffic that 
arrives to it. Redirection is the second goal, which is to send the traffic to a different 
destination and reveal the secret information contained in it. The third goal is 
Supervision which is a redirection but with the intention to modify the data and then 
send the packet to the correct destination. Finally, the fourth goal of BGP attacks is to 
cause instability in the network, which could happen by sending successive 
advertisements and withdrawals. This attack could happen by sending a false update or 
by prefix hijacking through announcing a prefix that the hijacker does not own or 
advertising a path it does not have. Another type of attack is link flapping, i.e., the 
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annoucement of a link failure then another annoucement of the recovery of the same 
link several times, to trigger a route flap dampening [11]. An incident of network 
instability due to prefix hijacking happened in April 1997 when AS7007 advertised most 
of the routes of the Internet causing an Internet outage for more than two hours 
[13,14,15]. Another incident of network instability occurred in April 2001 when AS3561 
forwarded a huge number of wrong advertisements from one of its downstream 
customers causing problems in connectivity [14,16]. The deaggregation of a prefix can 
attract traffic anywhere in the Internet due to the longest prefix match mechanism. It 
can then blackhole the victim network. This is because when a router selects where to 
route the traffic directed to a specific destination, the router first looks in its routing 
table for the longest prefix that matches the destination IP address even before running 
any selection process. There are many proposed counter measures against these types 
of attacks discussed in [13], two of them are discussed. The first one is the use of route 
filtering in order to enable ASes to filter out malicious or faulty updates; however, this 
requires them to know what to filter. In order to get ownership information of prefixes, 
Internet routing registries (IRR) databases can be consulted; however, these databases 
are not up-to-date [13]. The second solution is the use of a Secure Border Gateway 
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Protocol S-BGP [17].  Although this method can provide high security against attacks, it 
will add a high overhead on the Internet.  
3.5 BGP SECURITY 
Since there is no one point that controls the routing and because of the presence of 
many autonomous systems, each with its own policy, security is very important in the 
routing protocol that controls this system [18]. Nicholes and Mukherjee [18] the 
surveyed literature from 1988 to 2007 related to BGP security. They presented several 
methodologies used to secure BGP against attacks. Such attacks might be attacks on BGP 
peering like TCP attacks (e.g., TCP RST which drops the peer connection and TCP SYN 
flood which makes a connection with an invalid peer), and mounting attacks on BGP 
messages like eavesdropping, spoofing, modification, replaying, and deletion of 
messages. The attack might be on BGP routers like remote login or misconfiguration of a 
router. Misconfiguration of a router causes the router to claim a prefix that it does not 
own or export what should be filtered. Physical attacks include power failure, 
environmental failure, and link failure. These attacks cause loss of network connectivity, 
and problems in network reachability (like claim of a prefix), propagation of an invalid 
path; and if this propagated path is shorter, it will be accepted by most routers. Nickoles 
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and Mukherjee then discussed ways to protect the Internet against these types of 
attacks. They divided the methodologies into five major types. The first type is the use of 
cryptography and attestation. Attestation means to prove the identity of the one who 
provided the routing information. This is done by signing the advertisement. The second 
way is the use of a database that is either a history database or topology of prefixes 
database. A history database stores routing information based on previously advertised 
prefixes for specific ASes for some times and uses heuristics to validate paths. A topology 
of prefixes database validates the path given the knowledge of topology from a central 
router. The Third way is overlay, in which, routers cooperate together in order to 
validate route updates. Overlay does not require encryption and that reduces the 
memory and computation overhead on routers; however, the absence of encryption will 
make overlay susceptible to the same type of attacks that BGP has. The forth way is the 
penalty which is based on delaying misbehaving routes. One example is BGP Route Flap 
Damping described in RFC 2439 [11] which penalizes a BGP router based on continuous 
announcement and withdrawal. Finally, Data-Plane Testing means to test paths in the 
Data-Plane either by traffic monitoring (passive) or by packet dropping (active).   
Some studies of BGP focus on some changes of BGP attribute, like AS Path. For 
example, Blazakis et al. analyzed the behavior of AS Paths in the Internet and Introduced 
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the AS Path Edit Distance metric [19]. This metric can be used to represent changes of 
the AS path in the Internet, and this allows modeling and quantification of AS-Path 
values at specific ASes. They modified the Levenshtein distance [20], which is a measure 
of similarity between two strings, in order to perform comparison by considering AS 
numbers within an AS-Path as entities rather than characters. Since a change of the 
last AS path number should have a higher weight, a MAX_EDIT_DISTANCE attribute can 
be set to a larger value to represent this change. They tested their metric on the Internet 
and they found out that most changes in the path include one AS path and almost all of 
them are less than four. The AS-path Origin change appears as spikes, so path changes 
can be observed with previously known AS path anomalies. 
3.6 MOAS CONFLICT 
Zhao et al. described that the occurrence of more than one Autonomous System 
appears to originate the same prefix and called it Multiple Origin Autonomous System 
(MOAS) [21]. RFC 1930 recommended that a prefix should be originated from only one 
AS [22]. The authors defined MOAS analytically by having two paths that advertise for 
the same prefix, then there is a MOAS if the last autonomous system in the AS path of 
one of them is different from the other. MOAS can be divided into three different types. 
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The first type is OrigTranAS where an AS is an origin in one path and transit in 
another. The second type is SplitView where one of the ASes in the AS path 
announce different routes to different neighbors. The third type is DistinctPaths 
where two paths are completely distinct. There are a number of reasons of MOAS. At the 
Exchange point address, every router can advertise the prefixes associated with the 
exchange point address. This does not cause problems since every router knows how to 
reach any prefix and lasts for long time. The second reason is multihoming without BGP 
when we have two ASes having a static link or IGP protocol between them. So, one AS 
can advertise a prefix from the other because it can reach the prefix directly. This one 
also lasts for long time; however, it causes problems in case the link fails between the 
two ASes. The third cause is multihoming with a private AS number. This happens when 
a customer is multihomed and the providers remove the private AS number from the 
path. This also lasts for long time and does not cause problems. This also could happen 
due to aggregation mentioned in RFC 1930 [22] or Anycast which suggests the use of 
multiple origins. Finally, MOAS could happen due to a malicious or a faulty configuration 
of the routers. As we can see, long lived MOAS could be due to exchange point or 
multihoming (without BGP or private AS). Also, short lived MOAS could be due to faults 
or intentional attacks and a change of a provider for a non-BGP customer.  
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3.7 PREFIX HIJACKING 
The prefix hijack attack can be addressed by using a prefix hijack alert system (PHAS) 
[23]. PHAS is an email notification system that alerts a prefix owner whenever there is a 
change in the origin AS that owns the prefix. Every day there are a number of prefix 
changes and most of them are valid. However, only the AS that owns the prefix is 
capable of differentiating between a valid origin change and a prefix hijack [23]. The 
system examines the data collected in RouteViews [24] and notifies the prefix owner 
about any possible hijack. The user initially needs to register in the system and specify 
the prefixes to monitor. While monitoring, if there is any change in origin, the user will 
be notified via email (user can provide multiple emails to increase the chance of viewing 
any notification). A filter can be implemented at the user side to filter out any 
notification of valid origin change. PHAS succeeded to detect known prefix hijacks and 
the time reported by the system matches the time mentioned in other sources.  
Similarly, Zheng et al. [25] built an IP hijacking detection system. Their system 
depends on two observations noticed when there is no hijacking. The first observation is 
that the number of hops from a source to the prefix generally does not change (stable). 
The second observation is that the path from a source to the prefix covers the path from 
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the source to a reference point along the original path that is topologically close to the 
prefix. The paper focuses on two types of hijacking; the first type is imposture where the 
attacker imitates the behavior of the victim by responding to the sender of the hijacked 
traffic, and the second type is interception where the attacker spies on the traffic and 
records its content and then forwards it to the correct destination. These attacks are 
more challenging than blackholing which is dropping attracted traffic. The framework 
can be described as follows. For each prefix, a number of monitors are selected. Then, 
monitors measure network locations of prefixes to detect whether there is any 
considerable change in hop count distance measurements. The location does not change 
frequently, and when the difference between the previous location of the prefix and the 
current location exceeds a certain threshold, the path disagreement module is triggered. 
Because not every change in the location of the prefix is hijacking, and prefix hijack 
usually targets one specific prefix while a legitimate action involves a larger number of 
prefixes, the path disagreement test can be used to determine if a hijack occurs. A 
reference point is specified such that it is very close to the prefix and at the same time 
has an IP address that does not belong to the prefix. For each prefix, a number of 
monitors are chosen. The path to the reference point is compared with the path to the 
prefix and if they are different then a hijack is identified.  
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Hu and Mao implemented a prefix hijacking identification system [3]. This technique 
is based on collecting data from the control plane (passively collected BGP updates) and 
from the data plane (fingerprinting). Fingerprinting removes the ambiguity about an 
expected IP hijacking occurrence because it is based on information that identifies the 
hijacker. It is not possible for an attack to affect the whole Internet; more specifically 
routers which are close to the legitimate prefix owner most likely will not be affected. 
Fingerprinting based consistency check is based on information like Host OS properties, 
IP Identifier, TCP timestamp, and ICMP timestamp. The authors devised a way for each 
type of IP prefix attack type. The first type is to hijack a prefix by announcing its 
ownership. This will lead to a Multiple Origin Autonomous System (MOAS) conflict. 
However, MOAS can be a result of legitimate actions when there is multihoming with 
static link or multihoming with private AS numbers. So, fingerprinting based consistency 
check is used. Probing is performed to get fingerprints, then a check for any discrepancy 
is performed. This check will imply a potential IP hijack attack. The second way of attacks 
is to hijack a prefix and its AS by announcing a route to the hijacked prefix. For this case, 
we need to monitor all updates and perform an Edge popularity constraint and notice 
whether the prefix obtained was observed before. This update is highly suspicious if it is 
not the case. A geographic constraint is then applied to check if the two ASes are 
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physically separated. Finally, a relationship constraint can be conducted to check if there 
is any violation to routing policies inferred from AS relationships. The third type of 
hijacking is to hijack a subnet of a prefix by announcing a subnet of a prefix that it does 
not own. This will lead to subMOAS (MOAS of subnet of a prefix). Legitimate occurrence 
of subMOAS can occur due to similar reasons mentioned above about MOAS in addition 
to the case when a customer is multihomed to two providers. The first one aggregates 
the prefix with its own, and the other one cannot do aggregation and announce a path to 
a subnet of the prefix announced by the first router. To detect subMOAS, we need to 
monitor subMOAS updates. The authors assume that the provider will not hijack a 
customer’s routes on purpose because there is no economical motivation for that and it 
is easy to discover this type of attack through traceroute-like probing [3]. The detection 
is performed by monitoring subMOAS updates. Then a customer-provider check is 
performed by deducing a relationship between Autonomous Systems by assuming that 
legitimate AS-Paths are valley-free. Valley free means that if the path goes down it 
cannot go up again, or no AS-Path can have a customer-provider edge after a provider-
customer edge and there is not more than one peer-to-peer edge. Since a tier-1 AS is the 
highest point, routes before it are all customer-provider edges and what appears after a 
tier-1 AS are all provider-customer edges. The AS-path starts with the AS number of a 
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customer that announces its prefix to its provider then its provider which is a customer 
of another provider adds its own AS number to the AS-Path. This continues until a tier-1 
AS is reached. After this point every provider announces to its customer that a 
destination can be reached through them and as a result adding their AS numbers to the 
AS-Path. A reflect-scan technique needs to be performed in order to fingerprint the 
victim network. This can be done by probing the prefix of interest for IP ID and then 
sending a spoofed message to an address outside the subnet of a prefix but inside a 
prefix with the source IP address being an IP of the subnet of interest. Then, we probe 
again the IP ID from that prefix. If this IP ID is incremented by 2, then we declare that 
there is an attack, and if it is decremented by one then there is no attack. Usually, IP ID is 
incremented by one by the system for every message sent. The fourth type is to hijack a 
subnet of a prefix and its AS by announcing a path to a subnet of a prefix and add it to its 
AS-Path. This attack causes neither MOAS nor subMOAS and utilizes the longest prefix 
hijacking to attract traffic. The detection can be done by monitoring new non-subMOAS 
prefixes and then performing edge, geographic, and relationship constraints and then 
doing a reflect scan. 
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3.8 BGP MISCONFIGURATION 
Mahajan et al. [14] studied the impact of misconfiguration on the routing load and 
global connectivity. Their paper provides an explanation on why misconfigurations occur 
and suggests techniques to lessen their rate of recurrence and impact. They focused 
their study on two major misconfigurations. Origin Misconfiguration can be due to 
incorrectly summarizing the address space resulting in the injection of more specific 
prefixes into the global routing table. It can also be due to a hijack, i.e., announcing a 
prefix that one does not own, or it can happen because of propagation of prefixes that 
are not intended to be announced. The second main misconfiguration is export 
misconfiguration which occurs when the AS Path violates routing policies, i.e., when a 
router exports a route that should have been filtered. They studied the impact of 
misconfiguration routing load, connectivity disruption, and policy violation.  In analyzing 
origin misconfiguration, short lived events are considered due to misconfiguration. 
Origin misconfiguration can be classified into three types. The first type is self de-
aggregate, when a prefix de-aggregates or does not summarize its own prefix. Related 
origin is the second type, which occurs when the origin of one route appears in the AS 
path of the other. The third type is false origin, which happens when the prefix is 
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announced by a different origin as a result of address space hijack. To analyze “export 
misconfiguration”, the authors benefited from Gao’s two observations about AS 
relationships [26]. The first observation is that every legitimate AS-path must be valley-
free, which means that once the AS-path descend, it will never ascend once more, i.e., 
when an edge from provider to customer appears, no customer to provider link will 
appear after it in the AS-path. The second observation states that only one peer-to-peer 
edge can appear in the AS-path and at the highest point of the path. It can be deduced 
that the AS is provider if it has larger number of neighbors [26]. So, short lived paths that 
contradict with valley-free conditions or have more than one peer-to-peer connection 
are identified as possible misconfiguration. Email survey to prefix owners is conducted to 
evaluate the correctness of results.  According to [14], misconfigurations can be due to 
initialization bug, dependence on upstream filtering, legacy configuration, redistribution, 
non correct use of communities, hijacks and many others. 
3.9 OVERLAY PROTOCOLS 
Andersen [27] described in his master thesis the use of Resilient Overlay Networks 
(RON) for the detection of Internet outage and finding an alternative path to enhance 
reachability. The purpose of RON is to increase the reliability of a distributed application 
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by finding paths that BGP cannot find. An Overlay network is a “virtual network created 
on top of an existing network” where nodes work as routers for each others. The idea of 
RON is based upon the fact that the Internet is a “mesh of interconnected networks”, so 
many paths might exist. By limiting the number of nodes, one can allow more 
information about paths to be exchanged and hence be able to decide on a better path. 
RON can provide detection of faults, more reliability for applications, and better 
performance.  
In [28], an Overlay Policy Control Architecture (OPCA) is proposed. The purpose of 
OPCA is to support fault tolerance and improve routing between ASes. OPCA consists of 
five major components. A policy agent is responsible of announcing and enforcing 
policies to perform a route selection. A policy database helps policy agents to decide 
what to select as a route. Measurement information helps on deciding when to make a 
change in the route and measure the effectiveness of such a change. This information 
includes E-BGP link characteristics (e.g., capacity and bandwidth load) and customer-
server traffic characterization (e.g., total bandwidth, average latency) between the 
customer and the provider. The forth one is PA directory which is used to know which 
ASes implement OPCA. The last one is the AS Topology & Relationship Mapper (RMAP) in 
P a g e  | 37 
 
 
order to decide the flow of traffic and routing on the Internet according to route export 
rules. 
3.10 BGP TRAFFIC ENGINEERING 
Quoitin [4] designed and implemented a BGP modeling tool called C-BGP which can 
be used to compute routes in a large scale network topology [29]. Then, he studied the 
approaches of controlling outgoing and incoming traffic when the Regional ISP is 
multihomed. Usually, this control is either for the purpose of having a backup route or 
for load balancing. In his dissertation, he proposed a cooperative approach, called virtual 
peering, in order to provide a deterministic approach of controlling the incoming traffic 
[30]. His approach modifies slightly the BGP protocol by automating the establishment of 
virtual peering and adding BGP messages specifically to accomplish that. Only end 
systems need to have these modifications and there is no effect on intermediate 
systems. He used virtual peering in order to make load balancing for the incoming traffic 
and for selecting the path with the lowest delay. In this thesis, a virtual peering solution 
is adapted in order to solve the problem of malicious Internet blockage.  CHAPTER 4 
provides more details about virtual peering. 
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3.11 BGP SIMULATION TOOLS 
In addition to C-BGP discussed in section  3.10 written by Quoitin [4], a BGP++ is a C++ 
implementation of BGP over NS-2 and GTNets. It is built by extending Zebra bgpd open 
source code that simulates BGP [31]. Confederations, route reflection, and flap 
dampening are implemented in addition to other BGP specific techniques. BGP++ also 
supports BGP confederations, route reflection, flap dampening, and route-refresh 
capability. 
Wojciechowski proposed, in his master thesis, to build a BGP simulator [32]. In order 
to make a large-scale simulation of something similar to the Internet, he abstracted the 
intra-domain communication, network, and protocol. The author claims that the reason 
of BGP simulation is that BGP is too sophisticated to interpret analytically. The way the 
simulator is built is not to compute protocol parts that are not important for the 
simulator outcome. For this reason, link delays are ignored, no connection creation is 
used, and no KeepAlive messages are implemented. The author used a mathematical 
function in order to model the delay of message propagation inside Autonomous 
Systems. Since the author intended to calculate the convergence time, he considered 
two main factors that slow the convergence time. The first one is Minimum Route 
P a g e  | 39 
 
 
Advertisement Interval (MRAI), which stands for the least amount of time that must 
elapse between two consecutive update messages sent to the same neighboring router, 
and Route flap dampening, which is a technique that ignores an update from a router 
that continuously sends announcements and withdrawals by penalizing it. The author 
made his simulation to match real life as much as possible, and to make the entity run 
like if it is in real time. A distributed homogeneous cluster is used for emulation and Java 
is used as a programming language. An AS is modeled as a ‘compute Node’. He models 
the arrangement of events and providing some control by using a ‘coordinator Node’. In 
order to validate his experiment, he used BGP beacons which study and observe special 
prefixes. These beacons use Route Views Monitors, which are sinks that only make peer 
connection with other peers and store advertisements and withdrawals information [32] 
[33]. He compared the convergence time of his simulator and BGP beacons and 
described why there are some differences.  
3.12 BGP BEHAVIOR UNDER STRESS  
Wang et al. [34] studied the behavior of BGP under stressful circumstances, when 
reliable routing is desired. In order to perform their experiment they used the following 
classification. The BGP update is divided into either announcement or withdrawal. 
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Announcement can be divided into new announcement, duplicate, or implicit 
withdrawal. The new type can be a flap, a table exchange, a new announcement after 
withdraw different attribute (NADA)1, or a plain new announcement. The implicit 
withdrawal can be subdivided into SPATH when there is no change of the AS-path or 
DPATH where there is a change in the AS-path. The largest change is in BGP table 
exchange and implicit withdrawal; however, about 40.2% comes from monitoring points. 
Most BGP sessions restarted numerous times during the time of the worm attack, and 
every system reset means transferring the whole routing table, so even a small number 
of session resets can result in a huge amount of BGP updates.  Because of fast recovery, 
the authors concluded that these updates are due to congestion or routing problems. 
The authors mentioned also some drawbacks of BGP. Prosperous variety of routing 
policies causes incompleteness in the routing information that a monitoring point may 
receive and that causes the lack of necessary data to infer causes. 
                                                      
1 This means that for a certain path, this path is first withdrawn, then a new announcement come for 
the same path but with different path attributes. 
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3.13 BGP CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS  
Griffin and Primore [35] analyzed experimentally BGP convergence time. The authors 
studied the relationship between the convergence time and the timer that is used to 
limit the rate of transmitting routing messages which is called Minimum Route 
Advertisement Interval (MRAI). This timer damps some of the oscillations inherent in the 
path vector approach to routing. The authors also utilized Lobovitz observations about 
convergence time [36,37]. Lobovitz noticed that setting of two functionalities reduces 
the convergence delay. The first one is sender side loop detection (SSLD), which is an 
optimization in which a router discovers AS-path loops before an announcement is sent 
to a neighbor. The second one is withdrawal rate limiting (WRATE), which limits the rate 
of withdrawal messages as well as advertisement. They divided the experiments into two 
kinds of experiments; UP: when a single destination is advertised and the system is left 
to converge, and DOWN: when an origin withdraws the destination it announced in the 
UP experiment and the system is left to converge. The authors came to the following 
conclusions.  For each network and for each kind of experiment, the number of BGP 
updates goes down as we go from the value of 0 of MRAI and we increase it until we 
reach an optimal value Mu beyond which the number of BGP updates is stable. In the 
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same way, as we increase the MRAI going from 0, the required time to converge goes 
down until we reach an optimal value Mt beyond which the required time to converge 
increases. The authors concluded also that while the number of updates is constant, the 
minimum time to converge is directly proportional with the average router workload. In 
spite of the dramatic decrease of convergence time by choosing an optimal value of 
MRAI (Mt), this value is not the same for all networks and it may not be easy to compute. 
Setting the value of WRATE can increase or decrease the convergence time depending 
on the network and kind of experiment. WRATE has an insignificant effect when MRAI is 
set to the optimal value Mt. The convergence time is either decreased or not changed by 
setting the SSLD value. 
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CHAPTER 4 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF METHODS FOR CIRCUMVENTING 
MALICIOUS ISP BLOCKING 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the methods to circumvent malicious acts by IISP are explained and 
their advantages and disadvantages are discussed. The first solution is based on BGP 
tuning is presented where the focus is on configuring the router(s) to direct the outgoing 
traffic and to influence the incoming traffic to pass through the good IISP. The second 
solution utilizes virtual peering which uses a multi-hop BGP session and establishes a 
tunnel to control the traffic through the intended ISP to provide a deterministic control 
of incoming traffic. For the third solution, we propose a virtual transit approach in which 
multiple routers distributed across the Internet work as a transit for the blocked local 
region. This solution extends virtual peering so that routers advertise a shorter path to 
other peers on the Internet. We qualitatively compare the three proposed solutions in 
terms of traffic filtering, setup overhead, communication overhead, difficulty to offset 
the solution, and scalability. 
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4.2 METHODS TO COMBAT INTERNET SERVICE DENIAL 
4.2.1 BGP Tuning 
BGP Tuning means to use the available BGP policies in order to modify the BGP 
selection process to enforce the selection of the intended route as the best one. BGP 
tuning has been used as a way for traffic engineering [38]. In order to make sure that the 
traffic passes through the good IISP, the outgoing traffic needs to be directed through 
the good IISP and the incoming traffic needs to be influenced to select the good IISP as 
the best path in its BGP selection process. Therefore, we look at ways of controlling the 
outgoing and incoming traffic to direct routes through the non-malicious IISP.  
     4.2.1.1   Control of Outgoing Traffic 
Controlling the outgoing traffic is easier than controlling the incoming traffic because 
it is easier to configure the local router to prefer a route than to affect the selection 
process of all other routers in the Internet that are outside the control of the local ISP to 
choose the path through a specific IISP.  To control the outgoing traffic, the 
administrator of the RISP can set higher local-pref attributes of the routes learned 
from the good IISP. This assignment will ensure that all destinations reachable through 
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the good IISP will go through it. However, if there is a destination that is only reachable 
through the malicious IISP, the traffic will go through it. Subsequently, it will be 
blackholed and will not reach the destination.  Figure  4-1 depicts the use of the local-
pref attribute to control the outgoing traffic. 
 
Figure  4-1 Control of outgoing traffic using BGP tuning 
As shown in Figure  4-1, the traffic will go to all reachable destinations through the 
good IISP. For example, the traffic destined from AS1 to AS9 will pass through AS2 and 
AS8 and it will reach the destination through the good IISP. However, if we assume that 
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router R1 in AS 1 wants to send traffic to router R10 in AS10, then the only way to reach 
the destination is through router R3. In this case, the traffic will be filtered out and the 
destination will not be reachable. Setting up a tunnel or using any identity hiding 
technique can help to solve this problem.  
     4.2.1.2   Control of incoming Traffic 
Three ways to control traffic using BGP tuning will be investigated. These methods 
are AS Path shortening, more specific announcement, and communities. To achieve a 
better control of the incoming traffic, the three techniques can be combined and used 
together rather than individually.  
          4.2.1.2.1   AS Path Shortening  
In the selection process, when comparing two routes, if an AS Path of one route is 
shorter than the other, it will become more preferred. AS Path prepending has been 
widely used to make the path to a specific destination less preferred [39]. If the good IISP 
sends an announcement of our prefixes directly without adding the AS number of the 
local region in the AS-path, the length of its AS-path will be reduced by one. In this way, 
the incoming traffic can be influenced to come through the good IISP. In Figure 6, AS1, 
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which wants to control its traffic, will not have its AS number included in the AS-path 
advertised by AS2. In this way, AS7, for example, will prefer the route that comes from 
AS2 because it has a shorter AS Path to the prefix. However, if an AS has a local 
preference that leads to preferring routes to the prefix through the malicious router, 
then shortening the route will not influence the traffic. This is because local-pref is 
looked at first in the selection process of BGP. In addition, if the only way to reach a 
destination is through the malicious router, then the routes will be blocked. All these 
scenarios are shown in Figure  4-2.  
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Figure  4-2 AS Path Shortening 
As shown in Figure  4-2, the traffic will be influenced to go through the shorter path. 
For example, router R9 in AS9 will select to go through the path AS8 AS2 AS1. So, it 
passes through the good IISP, i.e., AS2. In case the path has a local preference to go 
through the malicious IISP, then advertising a shorter path will not help. For example, if 
R6 in AS6 decides to send traffic through the malicious IISP, AS3, because of local 
preference, then the traffic will be blackholed. Also, if the only path to a destination 
must pass through the malicious IISP as the case for router R10 in AS10, then the traffic 
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will be blackholed when destined to the prefix of AS1. This is because the traffic must 
pass through the malicious IISP, AS3. 
          4.2.1.2.2   More Specific Announcement  
When forwarding traffic, the destination of the traffic will be matched to the longest 
match of the prefixes in the routing table. In this way, advertising a more specific prefix 
through the good IISP will make all the routers select to reach the destination through 
the good IISP. Figure  4-3 depicts this technique. 
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Figure  4-3 More Specific Prefixes 
As shown in Figure  4-3, even if a path has a higher local-pref for routes that are 
destined to a certain prefix, a router will select the path with the longest prefix match 
even before it performs the selection process.  For example, AS6 has a higher local 
preference to routes received from the malicious IISP AS3. However, because more 
specific prefixes are advertised to AS6 from AS8, the traffic will select the path AS6 AS8 
AS2 AS1. Therefore, it will pass through the good IISP. Of course, if the only provider for 
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an AS is the malicious IISP, then the route must go through it and it will be blackholed 
like the case for router R10 in AS10.  
          4.2.1.2.3   Communities 
The third scheme to direct the incoming traffic through the good IISP is through the 
use of communities. An AS can advertise a path and assign a certain community number 
to it. A route map condition can then be set in some of the ASes in between to assign a 
higher local preference for routes with the community number assigned to the 
advertised path. As a result, these ASes will prefer the paths through the good IISP. 
Figure  4-4 shows the use of community to control the traffic. 
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Figure  4-4 Control the Traffic Using Communities 
As shown in Figure  4-4, cooperation with some of the ASes in the Internet, belonging 
to the same community, may be needed in order to prefer the routes with a specific 
community. Because the routes advertised from router R2 in AS2 belong to a certain 
community number, AS7 will set a higher local-pref for paths learned through AS2. 
So the traffic will go through AS2, the good IISP. Actually, there are certain community 
numbers that tell the AS to set a higher local preference for certain paths. Therefore, the 
router has to make sure that the routers will do this in case it advertises the paths with 
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this community number. If some ASes select to direct the traffic through the malicious 
AS because it is the only way to reach the destination, then the traffic will be blocked 
since it will face a blackhole as in the case of router R10 in AS10.  
4.2.2 Virtual Peering 
Quoitin [4] proposed the use of virtual peering to deterministically control the 
incoming traffic through one of the providers. He used virtual peering to achieve load 
balancing of incoming traffic among providers and to reduce the latency by choosing 
paths that have the lowest delay.  Since this method controls incoming traffic, we 
adapted it in order to direct the incoming traffic through the non-malicious IISP. The 
main contribution of [4] is the automation of setting up the virtual peering by using a 
virtual peering controller (VPC) that manages virtual peering establishment and removal. 
Figure  4-5 depicts the use of virtual peering to solve the malicious IISP blocking.  
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Figure  4-5 Virtual Peering based Solution 
The requestor autonomous system (RAS), which is the destination ISP, requests the 
establishment and removal of virtual peering connections. The source autonomous 
system (SAS) originates the traffic destined to RAS. The VPC in RAS needs to know the IP 
address of the virtual peering controller (VPC) in SAS. This can be done either manually 
or automatically by including the IP address of the VPC in the BGP update message as an 
extended community. When the RAS knows the IP address, it can establish a multi-hop 
BGP session with the VPC in the SAS. It can then send a Virtual Peering Establishment 
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(VPE) or a Virtual Peering Removal (VPR) to the SAS. After that, one of the border routers 
in the SAS will establish a tunnel with one of the border routers of the RAS so that the IP 
address used as destination address belongs to a prefix owned by the provider AS, which 
is the good IISP for our case. Knowing that the ISP assigns one of its IP addresses to the 
connection between the border routers, this IP address is used as a destination to the 
tunnel. Hence, the malicious router will not be able to figure out that this IP address 
belongs to the blocked prefix. The router can then  decapsulate the traffic and send it to 
the destination of interest. In order to force routes to go through the tunnel, a higher 
local-pref is assigned to them. One thing to note is that even if the traffic passes 
through the malicious IISP, the traffic will not be blocked because it will be destined to 
an IP not belonging to the prefix of interest.  
The multi-hop BGP connection should be established such that the traffic of BGP 
messages does not pass through the malicious IISP. If they pass through the malicious 
ISP, a BGP connection will not be established, since the BGP messages will be blackholed. 
Therefore, the choice of the IP address of the VPC in a virtual peering must be the same 
as the one used to set up the tunnel. Therefore, virtual peering shall be adapted such 
that the VPC is the same router that is used for establishing the tunnel to force traffic to 
pass through the good IISP.  
P a g e  | 56 
 
 
4.2.3 Virtual Transit (Hijack the Hijacker) 
In virtual peering, every source of traffic must do virtual peering in order to control 
all traffic coming from or going to the Internet. This is not practical for our solution, so a 
number of modifications of virtual peering can be done to make the solution scalable. 
We refer to this as a virtual transit solution. The main difference is that the transit router 
will advertise the prefix to other routers in the Internet. Another difference is that the AS 
Path can be set as a path of length two: the transit AS and the originating (or provider) 
AS. A number of virtual transit routers may be distributed in the Internet attracting the 
traffic destined to the prefix of interest and then passing it to the destination in a tunnel 
established in the same way as it is done with virtual peering. The concept of virtual 
transit is illustrated in Figure  4-6.  
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Figure  4-6 Virtual Transit 
As shown in Figure  4-6, the VPC in AS10 is a cooperative router. This router 
establishes a virtual transit connection with the VPC in AS1 in the same way virtual 
peering is established. However, it advertises to other prefixes in the Internet that it has 
a path to R1, and in order to influence more traffic, it shortens the AS-Path to two. The 
philosophy behind this is that since a tunnel is established between AS10 and AS1, then 
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the path will consider only these ASes in its advertisement. It may also advertise more 
specific prefixes in order to attract the maximum traffic.  
The idea of virtual transit can also be called ‘hijack the hijacker’. To clarify this, we 
can see that R3, a seemingly legitimate provider, is advertising a path to the local region 
to attract traffic with the ill intention of blackholing the traffic. The advertised path is 
superficially valid because AS3 is a provider for the local region and is geographically 
close. The Internet Routing Registry (IIR), a distributed database maintaining routing 
information and priorities, may even list AS3 as the legitimate ISP for AS1. On the other 
hand, the routers R10, R5, and R9, though are not obliged to advertise paths leading to 
the local region, they are doing so even with their distant geographical location and lack 
of physical connection to the local region. These routers (i.e. R10, R5, and R9) are 
cooperating with the local region to provide connectivity despite the malicious activity of 
R3. It is worth mentioning that with some implementation of secure BGP, this 
incongruity may identify the cooperative routers as hijackers, while it accepts the 
advertisements by the malicious router. Therefore one may consider this proposed 
mechanism as an ethical hijacking of the hijacking provider in order to counteract its 
malicious actions and gain access to the Internet.  
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4.3 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The use of local preference to control the outgoing traffic is good for most cases 
except for the case when the route must pass through the malicious provider. A tunnel 
might be used in order to hide the identity in this case and complete the solution. The 
use of AS Path shortening can attract traffic to the good IISP. However, major flows of 
the traffic will probably not be attracted. Examples include those routers that have a 
local preference to prefer the malicious route, those routers that can still see the path 
through the malicious route as a shorter path depending on their location, and those 
routers where the malicious router is the only provider. The use of more specific prefixes 
can attract more traffic through the good IISP. There is a limit, however, on the length of 
the prefix, and those that exceed this prefix can be filtered out by routers [4]. In 
addition, a disadvantage is that traffic will be blackholed when the only path to the 
destination must pass through the malicious router. 
Virtual peering combines the benefits of traffic engineering techniques and hiding 
one’s identity. Moreover, it provides a deterministic technique for the traffic to be 
forwarded to its destination through a specific provider. However, it requires 
cooperation between the sources of traffic and the destination. This means that every 
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source of traffic must do virtual peering with the destination in order to reach the 
destination through the good IISP. The rationale behind having a virtual transit is to 
make a limited number of virtual transit routers that advertise a prefix in a short AS path. 
These virtual transit routers will attract almost all of the Internet traffic if they are 
distributed around the globe and a sufficient number of them are installed. However, 
using a virtual transit does not completely guarantee that all the traffic will pass through 
the good IISP and will not be filtered, e.g., if a router has the malicious IISP as its only 
direct provider, then its traffic will be filtered out. 
In Table  4-1, we provide a comparison amongst all the methods considered in this 
study in terms of the following criteria: traffic filtering, setup overhead, communication 
overhead, difficulty to combat the method, and scalability. Each of these criteria is 
discussed in the next few paragraphs.  
Traffic filtering refers to the amount of the traffic that is expected to be filtered out 
(blackholed) using the methods listed in the columns. The method that leads to no 
filtering of traffic is virtual peering because a tunnel needs to be established to an IP 
address that does not belong to the blocked prefix between every source of traffic and 
the destination. This tunnel hides the identity in case the traffic flows pass through the 
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malicious IISP. Almost all of the traffic will not be filtered in the case of virtual transit 
because most likely the traffic will be attracted by one of the distributed cooperative 
routers that establish a tunnel to the affected routers. A very small amount might be 
filtered if one source of traffic is attracted by the malicious ISP because it might be its 
only provider. In BGP tuning, if it happens that the traffic needs to pass through the 
malicious router, then it will be filtered out.  
The second criteria in Table  4-1 is the setup overhead which is a measure of the time 
needed and the difficulty level faced in order to get all the required configurations 
performed to execute the method. The setup overhead is high in virtual peering and 
virtual transit, with respect to BGP tuning. This is because of the establishment and 
removal mechanisms of a virtual peer and virtual transit connections. This overhead is, 
relatively, medium for communities because configurations on cooperative routers are 
still needed. The setup overhead for AS-path shortening and more specific prefixes is 
very small since the configuration is needed only on one (the RISP) or two  (the RISP and 
the good IISP) routers. 
In contrast, the communication overhead refers to the number of messages that 
need to be exchanged between routers before the method is effective. Only virtual 
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peering and virtual transit have some communication overhead because of the 
establishment of the multi-hop BGP connection. For BGP tuning based methods, there 
are no external exchanged messages between routers other than those that are part of 
normal BGP conversations. 
The difficulty to combat the method is a measure of the amount of effort required by 
the malicious IISP to overcome the solution. One obvious disadvantage of BGP tuning 
based techniques is that the malicious IISP can easily mimic the tuning implemented by 
the local region to neutralize all the benefits gained. For example, it can shorten the AS 
path to be more preferred in the selection process. It can also advertise more specific 
prefixes so it can gain advantage of the longest prefix match. Moreover, it can advertise 
routes with the same community number advertised by the good IISP to combat the 
advantage of community. Although the malicious IISP can also make virtual peering and 
virtual transit, it is however very difficult to know that the traffic is destined to the 
blocked prefix and that this technique is used, since that traffic is apparently not sent to 
the prefix that is hijacked.  
Finally, in terms of scalability which refers to the easiness of extending the method or 
using it for the entire Internet, BGP tuning techniques provide the most scalability since 
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the configuration will affect the decision taken by the traffic in the Internet without any 
needed connection. In the case of virtual peering, if the blocked local region wants to 
direct all the traffic of the Internet to the destination through the good IISP, then a 
virtual peer needs to be established between all the sources of traffic and the 
destination. Virtual transit dramatically reduces the number of needed established 
tunnels while having almost all of the traffic of the Internet directed to the destination 
through the good IISP.  
Table  4-1 Comparison between Methods. 
BGP Tuning 
Virtual 
Peering 
Virtual 
Transit 
 
AS-Path 
Shortening 
More 
Specific 
Prefixes 
Communities 
Filtering the traffic Medium Small Small No 
Very 
Small 
Setup overhead Small Small Medium High High 
Communication overhead No No No Medium Medium
Difficulty to combat the method Easy Easy Easy Difficult Difficult 
Scalability High High High Small High 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, three techniques to overcome the problem of Internet embargo 
imposed by a malicious international Internet service provider (IISP) are discussed. These 
techniques are BGP tuning, virtual peering, and virtual transit techniques. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION & VALIDATION OF SOLUTION 
USING BGP TUNING BASED APPROACH 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, a qualitative analysis of methods to circumvent malicious 
IISP blackholing the local region’s traffic while advertising reachability information to it 
and to the rest of the Internet is presented. In this chapter, the concentration is on the 
implementation of the methods that use BGP tuning to control outgoing and incoming 
traffic using OPNET. 
OPNET [40] is a commercial tool used to design, test, and simulate the performance 
of a specific network. OPNET has an implementation of almost all the well known 
protocols. OPNET version 14.5 PL3 [41] provides BGP support and configuration. A user 
can configure autonomous systems and EBGP and IBGP connections. He can also 
configure policies to change the route attributes to control incoming and outgoing 
traffic. These policies include the setting of the local preference (local-pref), the use 
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of community, and the prepending of AS-Path. However, OPNET in its implementation of 
BGP does not allow reconfiguring the BGP in the middle of the simulation. In addition, 
AS-Path shortening and configuring more specific prefixes methods for controlling 
incoming traffic are not supported. Moreover, configuring a router to be malicious is not 
implemented by OPNET.  
The material in this chapter is presented as follows. First, the baseline configuration 
to serve as reference our work using BGP simulation is shown. Next, the use of traffic 
control using BGP basic implementation is presented. Finally and most importantly, our 
changes to BGP in order to be able to simulate the real scenarios of having a malicious 
node, to be able to do the changes in the middle of the simulation and support, and to 
be able to configure shortening and more specific prefixes are discussed. 
5.2 INITIAL SETUP 
In order to control the outgoing and incoming traffic and to validate our 
modification, we need to have a network setup that is able to validate the 
implementation. Aboelela book [42] has a simple experiment about BGP. The 
experiment is modified to match the needs of our simulation. Figure  5-1 shows the 
baseline configuration of the experiments done afterward. 
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Figure  5-1 Baseline configuration of validation 
5.2.1 Devices Used 
ethernet4_slip8_gtwy router:  is a gateway router that supports IP, UDP, RIP, 
Ethernet (IEEE 802.3), OSPF and SLIP protocols. Ethernet and other protocols. It has 4 
Ethernet 10BaseT/100BaseT connections and 2 serial Line IP connections at selectable 
data rates. [43]  
192.0.7.2 
192.0.8.2 
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The baseline configuration consists of seven routers are labeled from Router 1 to 
Router 7 are used. These routers are configured to support the BGP protocol. IBGP 
protocol is configured within each autonomous system and EBGP protocol is configured 
between routers in different ASes. An ellipse is drawn in Figure  5-1 to represent an 
autonomous system.  
100BaseT_LAN object:  is used to model a Fast Ethernet LAN which has any number 
of clients and one server. This object can support a number of applications including FTP, 
Email, Databases etc.  One can also configure the switching speed and the number of 
workstations. [43]  
In our baseline simulation, we use two objects named LAN_East and LAN_West. 
LAN_Wast is configured to use all types of applications or to work as a server for any 
type of application. LAN_East is configured to consider LAN_West as its destination and 
its HTTP server, so it will use the HTTP application.  
ip32_cloud node: represents an Internet cloud and has 32 serial line interfaces (only 
two of them are used in our experiment). It supports the RIP, UDP, IP, OSPF, BGP, IGRP 
and TCP protocols. The ‘Packet Latency’ can be configured which specifies the time the 
incoming IP datagram spends until it is forwarded out through one of the interfaces. This 
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delay can be configured to take any probability distribution. Also, the “Packet Discard 
Ratio” can be configured which determines the percentage of traffic to be discarded. 
[43] 
This node is used to model the delay of the Internet to study its effect on the 
convergence time. In this chapter, we will just assume the delay to be 0.001 second, 
however in  CHAPTER 6 different values will be considered. 
Bidirectional PPP_DS3 link: used to connect nodes that run the IP protocol using 
ip3_dgram packet format with DS3 (44.736 Mbps) data rate [43]. In our simulation, this 
type of link is used to connect routers with each other. 
Bidirectional 100BaseT link: is an Ethernet connection that operates at 100 Mbps. 
This link allows the configuration of “Propagation Speed” in meters/second.  In case the 
“Delay” is set to ‘distance based’, the propagation delay is calculated from the speed 
[43]. This link is used in the simulation to connect the router to the LAN objects. 
5.2.2 Mapping Devices Usage to our Problem 
In our simulation, we assume that AS 12 which contains Router 1 and Router 2 is in 
the local region and LAN_West contains the prefix of interest that is blocked. LAN_East 
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communicates with LAN_West to get services.  Router 2 is the Regional provider and it 
has two International providers, i.e., Router 3 and Router 4.  In the initial runs that uses 
OPNET supported features only, it is intended to get the traffic away of Router 3 and let 
it pass through Router 4. In the runs that include the added features and modified 
OPNET, Router 3 will be configured to be malicious and the traffic is directed away from 
the malicious router, and Router 4 will be considered the good ISP. 
5.3 CONTROLLING TRAFFIC USING SUPPORTED OPNET FEATURES 
As mentioned before, OPNET allows the configuration of routing policy to control the 
outgoing traffic and to influence traffic to come through one of the International 
providers if the local region is multihomed as the case in our initial setup. OPNET 
supports setting the value of the local preference of routes advertised from a 
neighboring router. This allows the administrator to set this value to control the 
outgoing traffic. In addition, OPNET allows modifying the AS-Path by prepending, to 
make the routes through a specific route less preferred. Also, the use of community is 
supported to allow the agreement with some remote routers to prefer routes with a 
certain community number. In this section, we will investigate the usage of these 
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configurations to control the traffic. No malicious router will be configured in this 
section. 
5.3.1 Normal Simulation Run 
The normal run of simulation means the result of the simulation without any special 
BGP configuration to control outgoing and incoming traffic.  Figure  5-2 shows the traffic 
between Router 2 and Router 3 and between Router 2 and Router 4 in both directions.  
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Figure  5-2 Incoming and Outgoing Traffic in Normal Mode 
The x-axis represents the time in seconds, while the y-axis represents the throughput 
in packets/second. We notice that the traffic goes through Router 3 in both directions. 
To double check, we can see the IP forwarding table of Router 2 and Router 5. They both 
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determine the incoming and outgoing traffic of the local region, i.e., AS 12, as shown in 
Figure  5-1.  
Figure  5-3 shows the IP forwarding table for router 2.  
 
Figure  5-3 IP forwarding table for Router 2. 
The IP address of LAN_EAST is 192.0.8.2 so it belongs to the prefix 192.0.8.0/24. We 
notice that the ‘Next Hop Node’ to this prefix is through router 3.  We noticed also that 
the route is inserted in the IP forwarding table at 70.048 seconds which is 0.048 seconds 
after the start of BGP.  
Figure  5-4 shows the IP forwarding table of router 5.  
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Figure  5-4 IP forwarding table of Router 5 
The IP address for LAN_WEST is 192.0.7.2 which is under the prefix 192.0.7.0/24. This 
entry in the table has its ‘Next Hop Node’ as Router 3 which is inserted at 70.043, 
seconds so it is at 0.052 seconds after the start of BGP protocol. The source protocol that 
it learned the route from is BGP.  
Figure  5-5 shows the convergence activity and duration of the normal simulation 
scenario. The upper part of the figure (Network Convergence Activity) shows the value of 
1 in the time when there is a convergence activity, otherwise the value is 0. The lower 
part of the figure (Network Convergence Duration) shows in the x-axis the time when 
there is the convergence started of a certain activity, and the y-axis shows the time it 
takes to converge. 
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Figure  5-5 Convergence activity and duration of normal mode 
Figure  5-5 shows that there are two convergence activities. The first one takes about 
0.052 seconds and the second one takes about 0.012 seconds separated by 30 seconds 
time. The first one is due to the start of BGP protocol, while the second one is due to 
minimum route advertisement interval (MRAI) which is set to 30 seconds. The MRAI time 
is a BGP parameter that can be configured and 30 seconds is its default value. MRAI 
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delay is enforced in the following situation. First, one of the routers receives an 
advertisement of a route to a certain destination. Then the same router receives another 
announcement to the same destination. Moreover it happens that this route is better 
than the previously announced one according to BGP selection process. This router will 
not propagate the second route to the same routers it announced to it before until MRAI 
time pass.  
5.3.2 Control of Outgoing Traffic 
To control outgoing traffic, the route attribute local-pref can be set to a higher 
value for routes that are coming from a certain neighbor. This affects the BGP selection 
process to prefer routes through the intended ISP. This can be done by configuring a 
route map that states if a route is received accept it and assign a higher local-pref 
to it, for example, 150, which is higher than the default value, i.e., 100. Then the route 
map is assigned as a policy to specific neighbor, Router 4 in AS4 in this case, and in the 
direction of ‘in’. In other words, Router 2 is configured to have this route map applied for 
each route learned from Router 4. Therefore, each route learned from Router 4 will have 
higher local preference and will be selected as best route according to BGP selection 
process. 
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Figure  5-6 shows the outgoing traffic from Router 2 to Router 3 and from Router 2 to 
Router 4, after applying the policy. 
 
Figure  5-6 Higher local preference to routes advertised by Router 4. 
As a result of applying a higher local preference to routes learned from Router 4, the 
outgoing traffic from Router 2 goes through Router 4. To check this, we show look at the 
BGP routing table of Router 2 which is shown in Figure  5-7. 
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Figure  5-7 BGP routing table of Router 2 in Normal Local-Pref Experiment 
As we can see the prefix 192.0.8.0/24 has its next hop node as Router 4. This is 
because the local preference is set to 150 which is more than the default value of local 
preference of 100.  
Figure  5-8 shows the convergence activity and duration for this experiment. We 
notice similar behavior to the baseline experiment. 
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Figure  5-8 Convergence activity and duration of Normal Local-Pref Experiment 
5.3.3 Controlling Incoming Traffic 
Two ways will be considered in the control of incoming traffic using OPNET, namely, 
prepending and community. The next section shows the use of prepending, and the 
section that follows shows the use of community to control the incoming traffic. 
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     5.3.3.1   Use of Prepending 
Prepending is to increase the length of an AS-Path; this is usually followed by 
advertising the path through a specific neighbor in order to control incoming traffic to 
prefer the routes learned through other neighboring providers. A router may be 
configured to lengthen the AS-Path by adding its own AS-Number to the AS-Path 
more than one time before advertising it to one of the neighbors. In this case, the AS-
Path becomes longer making the route less preferred. So to make the traffic less 
preferred through router 3, a prepended advertisement is sent to AS 3 and a normal 
advertisement is sent to AS 4. 
A route map is created that prepends the AS-Path by the same autonomous system 
(AS12), and then the route map is applied to the neighbor residing in AS3 in the ‘out’ 
direction. Figure  5-9 shows the incoming traffic to router 2 from both router 3 and 
router 4 after applying prepending. 
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Figure  5-9 Incoming traffic to Router 2 using prepending 
Figure  5-9 shows that the traffic travels to Router 2 through Router 4 in AS4.  The 
BGP routing table of Router 3, presented in Figure  5-10, shows how the route is 
prepended through it. It is shown for the prefix 192.0.7.0/24, which contains the IP 
address of the LAN_West, has AS-Path [12 12] of length 2. This makes the route less 
preferred when advertised to Router 5. 
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Figure  5-10 BGP routing table of Router3 in Prepend Experiment 
Figure  5-11 shows the BGP routing table for Router 5.  
 
Figure  5-11 BGP table of Router 5 in Prepend Experiment 
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As shown in Figure  5-11, Router 5 selected Router 4 as Next Hop Node to the prefix 
192.0.7.0/24 because it has a shorter AS-Path [4 12] than through Router 3 which has 
the AS-Path [3 12 12]. 
Figure  5-12 shows the convergence activity for this network. The behavior is similar 
to the baseline experiment. 
 
Figure  5-12 Convergence activity and duration for normal prepending experiment 
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5.3.4 Use of Community 
Another way of controlling incoming traffic can be done through the use of 
community. Community is an attribute of each route that can be received or advertised. 
The community attribute can have a list of community numbers. These community 
numbers can be interpreted by other routers and apply certain action for certain 
communities.  
Router 5 can be configured as follows. If it receives an advertisement with a specific 
community number, then it will set a higher local preference for that route. A route map 
can be configured in Router 2 to set every route to community 12:144 (this is one way of 
representing the community number, i.e., AS number followed by a colon then the 
community number in that AS), and then apply this route map for every route advertised 
to router 4. Router 5 can then check for any advertisement if it contains the same 
community number then it will assign a higher local preference to it, e.g., 150.  
Figure  5-13 shows the throughput of incoming traffic to router 2 from router 3 and 
from router 4. 
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Figure  5-13 Incoming traffic to router 2 using community 
Figure  5-13 shows a behavior of the traffic as in the case of prepending. Traffic to the 
prefix owned by Router 2 chooses the path through Router 4. To see how the community 
works, Figure  5-14 shows the BGP routing table of router 5. 
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Figure  5-14 BGP routing table of router 5 in the community experiment. 
It can be seen that all the routes whose community list contains 12:144 have their 
local preference is set to 150. For example, the prefix 192.0.7.0/24 whose community list 
is set to [12:144], has a local preference set to 150 by Router 5. A route map is defined in 
Router 5 as the following: if the route has the community number 12:144 in its 
community list, then it assigns the value 150 to its local preference.  As a result, the 
route through Router 4 is preferred. 
Figure  5-15 shows the convergence activity in this network which depicts similar 
behavior to the baseline experiment. 
P a g e  | 87 
 
 
 
Figure  5-15 Convergence Activity and Duration of Community Experiment 
5.4 MODIFICATION OF OPNET IMPLEMENTATION 
OPNET Implementation does not allow making reconfiguration in the middle of the 
simulation. The only way to trigger BGP activity reconfiguration in the middle of 
simulation can be done through failing a node or a link in a specified time. So we want to 
be able to specify a time at which the malicious ISP starts blackholing traffic and specify a 
time for applying counter measures or reconfiguring BGP in the middle of simulation. 
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OPNET does not allow BGP reconfiguration during simulation, and the configuration is 
only limited to the start of simulation.  
The following sections are presented as follows. First, a very short summary of the 
OPNET state model is presented. Then, we show our implementation of the malicious 
router. In that section, we include a short overview of part of the IP protocol 
implementation in OPNET, because it is needed in implementing the malicious router.  
After that, our modification to support reconfiguration is presented. The modification is 
introduced by a summary of the BGP protocol, because it is important to comprehend 
the modification of BGP protocol to do reconfiguration. Then, a section is presented to 
show the modification needed for the control of outgoing traffic. The section that 
follows, shows our modification to control the incoming traffic and that includes the use 
of community, shortening, and more specific prefixes. Since the implementation of 
shortening and more specific prefixes is not supported by OPNET, we show how we 
implemented them. In each section, a validation using the same Network setup shown in 
Figure  5-1 will be presented.  
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5.4.1 OPNET Process Model 
A process model is drawn in OPNET by a set of states representing a finite state 
machine of the protocol. The states can be forced or unforced (Blocking). The forced 
states are represented by a lighter gray level if black and white printing is used or a 
green color if colored printing is used. When the forced state is triggered, all the 
statements inside it are executed. Conditions to move to other states are directly 
evaluated and then execution moves to the following state. This is not the case when an 
unforced or blocking state is used. Unforced states are represented by a darker gray 
level when black and white printing is used or a red color if colored printing is used. 
When a state enters a blocking state, it just executes the “enter” executive of the state 
and then blocks or waits until a new interrupt or event occurs; and then it evaluates the 
conditions and decides what the next state is. 
5.4.2 Building a Malicious Router 
In this section, a quick description of the IP protocol implementation is shown. Then, 
we demonstrate the needed changes to build the malicious router. 
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     5.4.2.1   Summary of IP implementation 
The IP protocol in OPNET consists of a number of processes. The root process is 
ip_dispatch which initializes all variables and creates the needed children processes. 
Figure  5-16 shows the state diagram of ip_dispatch process. 
 
Figure  5-16 ip_dispatch process model. 
One of the children processes that is responsible for routing is the 
ip_rte_central_cpu process which has only one server and only one queue for all 
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packets. In our modification, we assume2 that this process is used for routing. We also 
assume the packet format is IPv4. Figure  5-17 shows the states of the 
ip_rte_central_cpu process model. 
 
Figure  5-17 ip_rte_central_cpu process Model. 
In the case of packet arrival, the method 
ip_rte_central_cpu_packet_arrival() is called. The three forced states to 
the right of the blocking state ‘ip_central_cpu’ are just to add delay in case the 
processing rate is not infinite. 
                                                      
2 In our simulation this process is used for routing, however OPNET offers another type of 
routing. 
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     5.4.2.2   Malicious Router Implementation 
A malicious router is a router that works as expected in term of IP protocol, but 
drops the packets that are destined to a destination belonging to a certain prefix. At the 
same time, the malicious router still advertises paths to that destination. Implementing a 
malicious node requires a change in the IP protocol, described above, to be able to 
configure a router to drop a packet if it is originated from or directed to an address that 
belongs to a certain prefix. At the same time, this router advertises forged paths to the 
rest of the Internet. An interface is provided for the user who wants to configure the 
malicious node to enter the time when to start blackholing and the prefixes that need to 
be blackholed. 
     5.4.2.3   Exact Modifications of the IP protocol Model 
In the bgp_dispatch process, shown in Figure  5-16, an interface is added to 
enable the user to configure a malicious router. The interface is shown in Figure  5-18. 
The user will be able to enter the time at which the blackholing should start and the 
prefixes that this router shall blackhole. To see the code modification of IP protocol, 
refer to  Appendix C section  C.2. 
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Figure  5-18 Interface to Configure Malicious Router. 
 In the ip_rte_central_cpu process shown in Figure  5-17, the method 
ip_rte_central_cpu_packet_arrival() is called whenever there is an 
incoming packet. So, this method is modified to call another method we define, i.e., 
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ip_rte_blackhole_traffic(..),  which takes as parameters the packet and 
other needed information and return true if the packet is dropped due to blackholing. 
Figure  5-19 shows the activity diagram for this method. Refer to  Appendix C 
section  C.2.1.2 to see how the ip_rte_blackhole_traffic is called. Refer 
to  Appendix C section  C.2.1.3 to see the implementation of blackholing function. 
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Figure  5-19 Activity diagram of blackholing method 
 
As shown in the activity diagram, the method first checks if there is a definition of 
malicious blackholing. If there is, it will read the time, otherwise it will return FALSE 
act MaliciousNode
Malicious blackholing defined?
Read time to start
blackholing
time > current simulation time
Read Fields of packet
get source address and
destination address from
fields of packet
blackholed_prefix = next
prefix in list of blackholed
prefixes
is destinatio n address in
blackholed_prefix
discard packet with reason
destination blackholed
is source address in
blackholed_prefix
Discard packet with reason
source blackholed
more prefixes exist
start
en d
Return FALSE
Return TRUE
en d
Yes
Yes
No Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
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meaning that no blackholing occurred. It then reads the source and destination of the 
packet and loops through the list of blackholed prefixes to find whether the packet 
source address or destination address fall in any of the blackholed prefixes. It will then 
discard the packet noting the reason and return that the packet is blackholed if there is a 
match. Otherwise, it will return that no blackholing occurred. In this malicious 
blackholing, a built in discard function is called ip_rte_dgram_discard. 
After running the simulation with a malicious router, blackholing is started at time 
300 as shown in the configuration in Figure  5-18 and the prefix 192.0.7.0/24 is 
blackholed.  Figure  5-20 shows the throughput traffic between Router 2 and Router 3 
and between Router 2 and Router 4, in addition to the dropped traffic of Router 3 at the 
bottom of the figure. The vertical line indicates when the malicious node started 
blackholing the traffic. 
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Figure  5-20 Throughput in a malicious configuration experiment 
 It is clear from the first two plots of Figure  5-20 that the traffic destined to or 
originated from Router 2 passes through Router 3. Then, the traffic stops passing at time 
300 due to blackholing.  It can be observed also that starting from the same time there is 
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a number of dropped packets but this number of dropped packets is less than the 
number of packets that were passing. This is due to the application used, i.e., HTTP 
which is built on top of TCP. TCP has congestion control implemented, so in case of 
message loss, TCP reduces the rate of sending messages. Also HTTP has timeout 
implemented if there is no acknowledgement resulting in less traffic sent. 
To see that the malicious Router is advertising a path to other routers, Figure  5-21 
shows the BGP table of Router 5.  
 
Figure  5-21 BGP table of Router 5 in Malicious Experiment 
It is clear that Router 5 has next hop of the prefix 192.0.7.0/24 as Router 3 and 
through the AS-Path [3 12]. 
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5.5 BUILDING COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST MALICIOUS ACTS 
In this section, a detailed description of different BGP tuning methodologies running 
in the middle of the simulation after the malicious router has started blackholing the 
traffic.  So this section is organized as follows. First a very short summary of OPNET 
implementation of BGP protocol is presented. Then, a description of the implementation 
needed to control the outgoing traffic is shown. This is followed by presenting the 
implementation needed to control the incoming traffic. 
5.5.1 Summary of BGP in OPNET 
The BGP implementation in OPNET consists of two processes: bgp process, and 
bgp_conn process. Figure  5-22 shows the state diagram of the bgp process. 
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Figure  5-22 bgp process. 
The ‘bgp’ process does the basic initialization and dynamically creates the 
connections with other peers and manages them. After the creation of a connection, the 
process will be in the Active state most of the time because it only goes after that to 
forced states except when the node fails.  When a BGP message arrives, it also invokes 
the corresponding child process. A child process is an instance of the bgp_conn process 
model that is shown in Figure  5-23. 
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Figure  5-23 bgp conn process 
The bgp_conn process is actually implementing the BGP FSM model. After the 
connection is established, the bgp_conn should be in the ESTABLISHED state most of 
the time, except when there is an error then it will go back to the IDLE state. 
5.5.2 BGP Modifications for Scheduled Reconfigurations 
An interface is provided to the user for every type of BGP tuning reconfiguration 
proposed. This interface enables the user to enter the time at which the effect of the 
reconfiguration should take place. The program takes all the reconfiguration requests 
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and stores them in a list. And then schedules a ‘self’ interrupt at the time specified. Refer 
to  Appendix C section  C.1 to see modification in the BGP protocol. 
Figure  5-24 shows a general overview of the methodology of making a 
reconfiguration in general. 
 
Figure  5-24 Reconfiguration overview. 
As shown in Figure  5-24, the information needed for reconfiguration is read and 
scheduled at a specific time when the RECONFIGURE event occurs.  After that, the 
direction of reconfiguration is tested whether it is ‘IN’ or ‘OUT’ to determine how to 
handle the interrupt. The child process will be invoked appropriately to complete the 
reconfiguration task. 
Figure  5-25 shows the modified BGP protocol to get the information needed. Since 
the state should be in active state when the event occurs, it is handled there. A 
reconfiguration state is created to test whether the reconfiguration is to affect ‘in’ 
analysis Reconfiguration
bgp process
Reconf igure
Reconf igure
Test In/Out ReconfigureIn
ReconfigureOut
Ino vke 
bgp_ conn
bgp conn proecess
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(incoming updates) or ‘out’ (outgoing updates) and then it switches to reconfigureIn or 
reconfigureOut state accordingly. 
 
 
Figure  5-25 Modified bgp process model 
As we can see, when the event of reconfiguring occurs, the RECONFIGURE condition 
will evaluate to true and the reconfiguration state is entered. At this state, the direction 
is checked and if the configuration is for the incoming routes, then the ‘reconfigIn’ state 
is entered; and when the direction is Out, then the ‘reconfigOut’ state is entered. As 
soon as the code is executed, the state will go back to the Active state, and this 
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execution includes the invocation of the child process ‘bgp_conn’ for reading some 
database, i.e. incoming and outgoing advertised routes, or for distributing the new route 
to other neighbors as it will be shown in the sections that follow. 
     5.5.2.1   Modification to Control The Outgoing Traffic 
local-pref is used in order to control the outgoing traffic. Changing the local-
pref parameter in the middle of simulation is not possible in version 14.5 of OPNET 
release. Therefore, we modified the built-in implementation of BGP to add this 
capability. To see the code of the control of outgoing traffic refer to  Appendix C 
section  C.1.1.6. 
To control the outgoing traffic, a modification of the local-pref of routes 
received from a specific neighbor is needed. Then, the selection process is triggered to 
prefer routes with a higher local-pref. Therefore, the change needs to be done on 
routes received from the preferred neighbor. In this case, the direction of advertisement 
is ‘In’. To implement the reconfigIn, a similar activity to what is done in the Update 
message state needs to be implemented, except that this time the route is read from the 
‘rib-in’ and not from the advertisement. ‘rib-in’ is a database that is used to store every 
advertisement received from a specific neighbor. When a reconfiguration event occurs, 
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the route map policy associated with the event, i.e., setting higher local preference, is 
applied on the ‘rib-in’ routes. After this, the modified routes are treated as if a new route 
is received. So, the BGP selection process works normally to select the best path. Of 
course, it shall select the routes with higher local preferences. Finally, the routing table is 
updated which will affect the forwarding decision by the IP protocol. 
In the ‘reconfigureIn’ state, the corresponding child is invoked which and shall be in 
the Established state. The child process is modified to handle this invocation and achieve 
the required modification to the route. The child process will check the ‘rib-in’ for this 
neighbor, apply the route map on the routes, and then add the modified routes to a list 
visible to the parent process, i.e., bgp process. Figure  5-26 shows how the child process 
handles reconfiguration. 
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Figure  5-26 Handling ReconfigureIn in a child process 
The parent process then processes the newly added routes to ‘rib-in’ one by one and 
determines if they are better than the existing routes to the destination. If that is the 
case, then the local-rib is changed in addition to IP routing table and the new route will 
be propagated to other neighbors. Figure  5-27 shows the handling of reconfigIn of the 
parent process after the child is returned. 
act Reconfig In Child
More entrie s in rib in
Access next entry and
apply policy
Entry change?
Update rib in
Add to new rib in
start
en d
Yes
Yes
No
No
P a g e  | 107 
 
 
 
Figure  5-27 Handling of ReconfigIn in parent 
As shown in Figure  5-27, the updated ‘rib-in’ routes are used to update the local rib 
and routing table by replacing an existing route to a specific entry if the route is 
preferred over the existing one. Also, it is clear from this figure, our reuse of two major 
functions in OPNET to handle reachability information and to propagate it to other 
routes. 
The experiment is conducted by having a malicious router starting at time 300, and 
configuring ‘local-pref’ to be applied at time 350. Figure  5-28 shows an example of 
specifying the time when applying a route map. 
act Reconfigure Parent
Insert The new rib out as new
reachablity Information
Process reachability
information, apply selection
process, update local rib and
routing table
Propagate to other nodes
P a g e  | 108 
 
 
   
Figure  5-28 Specification of time when applying route map. 
After running the experiment, the incoming and outgoing traffic of Router 2 with 
Router 3 and of Router 2 with Router 4, in addition to the traffic drop are shown in 
Figure  5-29. 
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Figure  5-29 Throughput traffic after applying localpref in the presence of a malicious router 
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Referring to Figure  5-29, it is clear that applying a higher local-pref to the route 
does not show that the outgoing traffic is passing through Router 4. To make sure that a 
change has occurred, we can see the IP forwarding table of Router 2 in Figure  5-30. 
 
Figure  5-30 IP forwarding table of Router 2 in Local-Pref and Malicious experiment 
It is clear that at time 350, the prefix to 192.0.8.0/24 is inserted in the table. This 
route entry was initially through Router 2. To see this, Figure  5-31 shows the IP 
forwarding table for Router 2 at time 71.  
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Figure  5-31 IP forwarding table of Router 2 at time 71 in the Local-pref and Malicious experiment 
Figure  5-31 shows that the entry that has in the destination to the prefix 
192.0.8.0/24 has Router3 as the ‘Next Hop Node’. The local preference to this 
destination at time 71 was set to 100. Figure  5-32 shows the BGP routing table at time 
71. 
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Figure  5-32 BGP routing table of Router 2 at time 71 for Local-pref and Malicious Experiment 
Figure  5-33 shows the BGP routing table of Router 2. This table shows that because 
this route has a higher local preference it is selected as the best to 192.0.8.0/24 
destination. 
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Figure  5-33 BGP Routing Table of Router 2 in Local-pref and Malicious Experiment. 
Although the routing table of Router 2 shows that the router has the next hop to 
LAN_East destination as Router 4, and Router 4 is not malicious, we cannot see any 
outgoing traffic after Router 3 becomes malicious. The reason is because of the way the 
application works. LAN_East runs as a client requesting from the HTTP server in 
LAN_West some services. Simply LAN_East did not reply because it does not receive 
requests. Message exchange between routers is depicted in Figure  5-34. In this figure, 
Router 1, Router 6, Router 7 and the Internet are not shown for clarity and because they 
don’t play a major role in the decision, but they only forward messages. So, between 
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LAN_West and Router 2, Router 1 resides and between Router 5 and LAN_East, Router 6, 
the Internet, and Router 7 reside.  
 
Figure  5-34 Message exchange for the Malicious and Local-Pref 
As shown in Figure  5-34, Initially, LAN_East sends an HTTP request to LAN_West and 
it gets a reply as expected. After that, Router 3 starts to behave maliciously; Router 2 will 
sd LocalPref Malicious Sequence
Router2 Router3 Router4 Router5 LAN_EastLAN_West
Blackhole
Blackhole
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Response()
HTTP Response()
HTTP Response()
HTTP Response()
Malicious Blackholing()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
change local pref()
prefer route through Router 4()
Timeout()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
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not receive the request. So even after the local-pref is changed, because the 
incoming traffic for this application is coming from the malicious router, no reply is 
expected.  
Figure  5-35 shows the convergence activity of the network. 
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Figure  5-35 Convergence activity of the local pref and malicious experiment 
Due to change in the local-pref at time 350 seconds, BGP needs less than 0.005 
seconds to converge according to the convergence activity shown in Figure  5-35. 
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     5.5.2.2   Control of Incoming Traffic: The Use of Community 
Among the proposed BGP tuning methods for controlling the incoming traffic and 
solving the problem of malicious IISP, the community method is readily implemented. 
The only thing needs to be done is to allow the reconfiguration of the ‘OUT’ routes in the 
middle of the simulation. In this section, a description of the methodology to allow 
applying route maps that target the ‘OUT’ routes, i.e., the routes that are advertised to 
other BGP speakers or routers. This is done in order to influence the routers to prefer 
the paths through the good ISP in the middle of simulation. Then, this is experimented 
by the use the community method.  
The user configures the ‘out’ configuration in the same way he configures the ‘in’ 
configuration. The procedure to do this reconfiguration in the middle of the simulation is 
in the following way. First, the policy is applied on the ‘rib-out’ table of a specific 
neighbor (the good IISP) then the modified route is sent to that specific neighbor. 
Figure  5-36 shows the implementation of the ‘reconfigureOut’ state. 
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Figure  5-36 ReconfigOut Activity Diagram 
The first experiment in controlling the incoming traffic is by the use of community. At 
time 350, Router 2 resends the routes in ‘rib out’ to Router 4 but with certain community 
number 12:144. When this advertisement is received by Router 5, Router 5 will give a 
higher local preference to these routes. As a result, the incoming traffic is influenced to 
prefer paths through the good IISP, i.e., Router 4.  Figure  5-37 shows the throughput 
between Router 2 and Router 3 and between Router 2 and Router 4 in both directions. 
In addition, the figure shows the packets dropped due to malicious act that started at 
time 300. 
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Figure  5-37 Throughput between Router 2 and Router3, Router 4 and Packet drop of Router 3 
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As shown in Figure  5-37, the traffic going from Router 2 to Router 3 stops for some 
time and then some traffic appears again. Also there is some traffic coming from Router 
4 to Router 2 after applying the change for the incoming traffic. There is also an 
equivalent number of dropped traffic even after the policy is applied. The reason for this 
behavior is that the incoming traffic arrives through Router 4 but the outgoing traffic is 
going through Router 3. So this traffic is blackholed in Router 3 and the response does 
not reach to Router 3. 
Figure  5-38 shows the BGP routing table of Router 5. 
 
Figure  5-38 BGP routing table of Router 5 in malicious and community experiment 
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As shown in Figure  5-38, the route to the prefix 192.0.7.0/24 has the community set 
to [12:144], so its local preference is set to 150. That is why the route through Router 4 is 
preferred. Figure  5-39 shows the BGP routing table at time 71 to see the previous 
decision taken before sending an Update message that contains the community number. 
 
Figure  5-39 BGP routing table of Router 5 malicious & community experiment at time 71 before sending update 
message with community number. 
The route to the prefix 192.0.7.0/24 at time 71 is through Router 3 and has local 
preference of 100 and no community set. 
Figure  5-40 shows the message passing between routers in this experiment. 
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Figure  5-40 Message Passing between routers in community and malicious experiment 
sd Community
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HTTP Response()
Malicious Blackholing()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
Apply Community to Rib Out()
Incremental BGP Update()
Update Local RIB()
Incrementatl BGP Update()
Assign higher local preference()
Update local rib and forwarding table()
Timeout()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Request()
HTTP Response()
HTTP Response()
Timeout()
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As shown in Figure  5-40, after the community is applied, the requests are received 
normally; however, the replies are blackholed, so the application as a whole did not 
work. Therefore, In order to make the application work fully, both incoming and 
outgoing traffic must be directed through the good IISP. 
Figure  5-41 shows the convergence activity and duration of the community and 
malicious experiment. 
P a g e  | 124 
 
 
 
Figure  5-41 Convergence Activity in Community and Malicious 
The network takes about 0.018 seconds to converge after the change is applied by 
the use of community. 
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     5.5.2.1   Shortening 
As we mentioned earlier, shortening is not supported by BGP. To configure 
prepending, the user shall specify in the route map that he wants to change the AS-
Path and set ‘prepend’ as an Action, then set what the user wants to prepend. After 
that, the user can apply this route map for the IISP that he wants the traffic not to pass 
through. In the OPNET implementation, if the user did specify nothing to prepend, the 
AS-Path is not affected. This has the same effect as if the user did not set the ‘set as’ 
property in the route map. So, I utilized this to implement the shortening. Figure  5-42 
shows how the user can configure shortening by just having the ‘Set Value’ in the route 
map to set to empty. Refer to  Appendix C section  C.1.3 to see the shortening code. 
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Figure  5-42 Shortening Configuration 
In order to implement shortening, two routers need to be involved, i.e., the regional 
ISP and the international ISP. An agreement between them has to be accomplished, and 
that is if the route is advertised with certain community number then it shall be 
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shortened. The regional ISP is configured to send a route update with a certain 
community number at a specific time. The good International ISP (IISP) is configured to 
check any route that is coming and if it has this community number, it will shorten the 
route. Shortening the route means to remove the AS number of the regional ISP and 
then advertise the route by adding only the AS number of the IISP. The advertised route 
to the Internet should then be shorter by one than the one advertised by the malicious 
ISP attracting more traffic through the good one. All the ‘rib-out’ that are advertised 
previously to the neighbor will have to be sent again with their community number set 
to a specific value.  
For this experiment, shortening and local preference will be applied at the same 
time, i.e., 350, in order to check whether the traffic recovers after the malicious router 
starts being malicious at time (300). Figure  5-43 shows the throughput between Router 2 
and Router 3 and between Router 2 and Router 4 in both directions in addition to the 
traffic dropped at Router 3. 
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Figure  5-43 Throughput between Router 2 and Routers 3 & 4 and dropped traffic of Router 3 
It is clear from Figure  5-43 that when both the incoming and outgoing traffic go 
through the good IISP, the traffic will recover. We see that only for small amount of time 
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there is a traffic drop due to the malicious act, and then the traffic continues to pass but 
through Router 4 to its destination. To see the changes occurred, Figure  5-44 shows the 
Router 5 BGP routing table at the end of simulation. 
 
Figure  5-44 BGP routing table of router 5 in shortening, localpref, malicious experiment 
As shown in Figure  5-44, the route to prefix 192.0.7.0/b24 has its AS-Path set to 4 
of length 1, although there are actually two ASes to reach this destination. But, because 
Router 4 has shortened the route, Router 5 preferred it. Figure  5-45 shows the BGP 
routing table of Router 5 at time 71, before the receipt of the shortened route through 
Router 4. This figure shows that for the same prefix, Router 3 was chosen as the next 
hop which has an AS-Path length of 2. 
P a g e  | 130 
 
 
 
Figure  5-45 BGP routing table of Router 5 in shortening, local-pref, malicious experiment 
Figure  5-46 shows the message passing between routers for this experiment. 
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Figure  5-46 Message Passing in Shortening, LocalPref, and malicious experiment 
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As shown in the Figure  5-46, applying local-pref and shortening will switch the 
routing table of Router 2 and Router 5 to select the path through Router 4 for the 
communicating nodes.  
Figure  5-47 shows the convergence activity for this configuration. 
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Figure  5-47 Convergence activity and duration for shortening experiment 
As shown in Figure  5-47, the third line/dot represents the change that occurs in the 
middle of the simulation at time 350. It takes about 0.022 seconds to converge. 
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     5.5.2.2   More Specific Prefixes 
OPNET allows the user to configure routers to advertise certain prefixes even if they 
are not redistributed from other protocols. However, it does not allow specifying a 
neighbor to whom the advertisement should go. We modified OPNET implementation of 
BGP so that the user can specify the neighbor, the main prefix, and the more specific 
prefixes which will take the same route attribute values of the main prefix. Figure  5-48 
shows the interface provided to the user to configure more specific prefixes. Refer 
to  Appendix C section  C.1.4 to see the code of more specific prefixes. 
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Figure  5-48 More specific prefix interface 
The protocol will first search the ‘rib-out’ for the specified prefix. And then, it will 
create routes with prefixes assigned as more specific with the same route attribute of 
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the found route. Then, the more specific prefixes are added to ‘rib-out’ and sent to other 
neighbors. Figure  5-49 shows the procedure of implementing more specific prefixes. 
 
 
Figure  5-49 More specific prefix Implementation 
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start
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No
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In this experiment, the more specific prefix event and the increase local preference 
event are scheduled at the same time, i.e., 350, to control both the incoming and 
outgoing traffic. The malicious action starts at time (300). Figure  5-50 shows the 
incoming and outgoing traffic to Router 2 for both Router 3 and Router 4, in addition to 
the dropped traffic by Router 3 (the malicious router). The figure shows that the traffic 
changed its direction to the good IISP after a period of time during which there are some 
dropped packets. 
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Figure  5-50 incoming and outgoing traffic of Router 2 in more specific, local preference, malicious experiment 
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Figure  5-51 shows the BGP routing table of Router 5. The table shows clearly the 
addition of the prefixes 192.0.7.0/25 and 192.0.7.128/25. These prefixes exist with the 
prefix 192.0.7.0/24, and because of the longest prefix match these prefixes are chosen in 
routing traffic to its destination. 
Figure  5-52 shows the message passing in this experiment which is similar to the 
shortening message passing, except that at this time a new route that has its AS-Path 
shortened is advertised and added to the BGP routing table and the IP forwarding table.  
 
Figure  5-51 BGP routing table of router 5 of more specific, local pref, malicious experiment 
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Figure  5-52 Message Passing in More specific, local pref, malicious experiment 
Figure  5-53 shows the convergence activity of this experiment. 
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Figure  5-53 Convergence activity and duration of more specific, local pref, and malicious experiment 
The third line/dot in Figure  5-53 represents the convergence of the network for this 
experiment. It takes about 0.022 seconds for the network to converge. 
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5.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the use of OPNET to simulate BGP tuning techniques for 
solving the malicious problem. It shows our modification of the OPNET code in addition 
to its impact on convergence. All the methods and the modifications are supported by 
validation scenarios which include throughput, drop rate, convergence time, and routing 
tables. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF BGP TUNING TECHNIQUES TO 
CIRCUMVENT MALICIOUS ACT 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In  CHAPTER 5, the implementation and validation of BGP tuning techniques to solve 
the Internet blocking by the malicious IISP are presented. In this chapter, the focus is on 
the performance evaluation of different BGP tuning based solutions with different 
network configurations in terms of Internet delay, traffic type, and network loads.  
The same network topology used in the last chapter will be used in this performance 
evaluation. Figure  6-1 shows the network topology that will be used in the evaluation. In 
this chapter, the blackholing starts at time 300, the solution starts at time 360, and the 
total simulation duration is 2000 seconds. The link used in performance evaluation 
between routers is PPP_DS1 that has a data rate of 1.544 Mbps that is lower than the 
PPP_DS3 link used in the previous chapter and which has a data rate of 44.736 Mbps. 
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This change is done in order to study the effect of the network load the network within 
an acceptable simulation time. 
 
Figure  6-1 Evaluation Network Setup 
The solutions that will be evaluated are the use of community, the use of shortening, 
and the use of more specific prefixes to control incoming traffic. These methods are 
combined with the setting of the local-pref attribute in order to control the 
outgoing traffic. The delay of the Internet node modeled by the IP_cloud follows an 
exponential distribution with a mean of either 0.1 seconds or 5 seconds is used to 
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represent two extreme cases. The applications used to generate the traffic are 
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VOIP). Both HTTP and FTP run over TCP protocol. The links connecting the IP 
cloud to Router 6 and Router 7, see Figure  6-2, are loaded at 20%, 50%, and 80%. So 
knowing the link capacity, one can configure the links to be loaded with specific traffic 
amount equivalent to any of the three percentages.  
 
Figure  6-2 Network showing the links that will be loaded with traffic. 
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A number of outcomes are investigated in the evaluation. The first outcome is the 
percentage of packet drop to the total number of application packets that are generated 
during 2000 seconds of simulation time. The time of blackholing is 60 seconds starting at 
300, and the solution is applied at time 360. The convergence time of BGP protocol in 
the whole network is the second outcome. The third outcome is the throughput in the 
link between Router 2 and Router 3 and the link between Router 2 and Router 4 in both 
directions. Finally, application specific outcome includes the traffic sent from and 
received to LAN_East and the response time for an HTTP page and an FTP download. 
These results are generated for each proposed solution, for each application or traffic 
type, for each link load, and for each delay of the Internet. Each experiment runs for 20 
times in HTTP and FTP applications and for 5 times in VOIP application; and either the 
mean or the mean and the confidence interval are displayed in the figures. The results 
for the VOIP application when the delay is exponential with 5 second as mean and when 
the load on the link is either 50% or 80% are excluded, because the simulation has some 
problems. For more information on this, refer to section  6.3. Table  6-1 shows a list of 
output figures, a brief definition and why it is chosen. 
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Table  6-1 List of output figures, brief definition and why they are picked 
Outcome Figures Definition Why Chosen 
Percentage of 
Packet drop 
Figure  6-3  
The number of packets 
that are dropped over 
the total number of 
packets sent in both 
directions 
Packet drop is the main drawback 
of blackholing and so it is chosen 
to see how the routers behave 
during the time of blackholing 
Convergence 
time 
 Figure  6-4 
and 
Figure  6-5 
The time until all 
Routers update their 
BGP tables according to 
the BGP update 
messages that are part 
of applying the solution 
Since the solution is BGP based, 
the convergence time is an 
important measurement to study 
the effectiveness of the solution 
and to study the behavior of the 
solutions in different configuration 
scenarios  
Throughput 
 Figure  6-6 
to 
Figure  6-17 
The throughput in bits 
per second is studied in 
links between router 2 
and router 3 and 
between router 2 and 
router 4 in both 
directions 
Since these two links are the links 
connecting the regional ISP to the 
good and malicious IISP, we are 
interested in studying the behavior 
of the link in both directions 
Traffic 
Sent/Received 
(application 
level) 
Figure  6-18 
to 
Figure  6-23 
 
 
The application packets 
that are sent from the 
LAN_East and the 
application packet 
received as seen by 
LAN_East 
To see the effect of blackholing 
and solution on different 
applications 
Response 
Time 
 Figure  6-24 
and 
Figure  6-25 
For HTTP and FTP 
applications 
To see the effect of receiving a 
page in HTTP or downloading a file 
in FTP at the time of blackholing 
and when the solution is applied 
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6.2 COMPARISON3 
6.2.1 Percentage of traffic drop 
Figure  6-3 shows the percentages of packet drop for different solutions. The x-axis 
displays the experiment configuration and the y-axis displays the percentage of packet 
drop. In the x-axis there are three-valued configuration parameters. The first parameter 
is the application type, the second one is the mean of the exponentially distributed delay 
of the Internet, and the third one is the link load. The type of solution applied is 
displayed in the legend in the bottom of the figure. The vertical bars are the confidence 
intervals of the readings with 95% confidence Interval. 
                                                      
3 Refer to  Appendix A to see the application default configurations for TCP, HTTP, FTP and VOIP. 
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over UDP and does not wait for an acknowledgement to send the next packet. 
Therefore, this results in a higher percentage of packet drop. The confidence interval of 
VOIP application for the 0.1 mean delay of the Internet is very small because of the 
consistency of packet sending irrespective of blackholing. However, the confidence 
interval of the percentage of packet drop for the VOIP application increases when the 
delay is 5 seconds because of the increase of the randomness4 of the delay that each 
packet experiences. This also applies to all experiments with 5 seconds delay. The 
percentage of packet drop in HTTP is about double the percentage of packet drop in FTP 
application in both 0.1 second delay and 5 seconds delay. This difference is due to the 
nature of each application and how it is configured. To illustrate this, the interarrival 
time for HTTP messages is set to 60 seconds as a mean, while the inter-request time for 
FTP has a mean of 360 seconds as shown in Figure  A-2 and Figure  A-6 respectively. So, 
the difference is large in terms of interarrival. Increasing the delay of the Internet results 
in more packet drop, e.g., in HTTP, the 5 seconds delay causes the packet drop to be 
about three times more. The reason is that TCP adjusts its retransmission based on the 
Round Trip Time. The increase of the delay increases the Round Trip Time and that 
                                                      
4 Because when the mean is 5 seconds in the exponential distribution, the standard deviation will be 
also 5 seconds and this increases the randomness of the delay. 
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makes the TCP detection of packet loss slower. Hence, the behavior of TCP to reduce the 
rate at which packets are sent is delayed resulting in more packet drop. Moreover, due 
to the delay of the Internet node, more packets will be in the network from the time the 
blackholing starts, and this will result in more packets being dropped. Also the delay of 
the Internet increases the convergence needed for BGP, resulting in more time the 
packets continue to pass through the malicious node and resulting in more packet drop. 
Assigning different loads has insignificant effect on the percentage of packet drop. This is 
because only two links are loaded on the network and also even when the links are 80% 
loaded, this will leave space for all other traffic on the network that the experiments 
need. Some of the experiments show slight increase in packet drop due to adding more 
load, and this is clear in the HTTP application when the delay of the Internet is 5 seconds. 
Different solutions have similar effects in terms of percentage of packet drop. 
6.2.2 Convergence Time 
Figure  6-4 shows the convergence time for the 0.1 seconds as a mean delay of the 
Internet. The x-axis displays the experiment configuration and the y-axis displays the 
convergence time needed in seconds. The vertical bars depict the 95% confidence 
interval. It is worth mentioning that when the delay of the Internet is of a certain mean, 
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BGP message appears to experience this delay twice. This is because when a new 
advertisement to the Internet node arrives the delay is experienced. And, if as a result of 
this advertisement a another advertisement need to be sent another delay is imposed. 
As shown in Figure  6-4, lower convergence times are exhibited for the more specific 
prefix solution than the shortening and community solutions. This is because of the way 
the solution is implemented. In shortening and community techniques, the algorithm 
look at ‘rib-out’ in order to know which prefix needs to be advertised. In more specific 
prefixes technique the user only enters the prefix of the LAN_East.  So only two more 
specific prefixes needs to be advertised compared to six prefixes in shortening and 
community solutions. See Figure  5-38 for community, Figure  5-44 for shortening, and 
Figure  5-51 for more specific prefixes. In practice, shortening and community need not 
to advertise more than one prefix for this example. However, the more specific prefix 
solution might need to advertise more than one to cover the whole range of the prefix.  
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considerably larger number of packets than HTTP and FTP applications, so VOIP has the 
highest convergence time. This is normal since VOIP simulates a voice call which 
generates more traffic and the total throughput will be more than FTP and HTTP. Look 
at  A.2,  A.3, and  A.4 for HTTP, FTP and VOIP configurations sequentially. 
Figure  6-5 shows the time needed to converge in case the mean of Internet delay is 5 
seconds. The x-axis displays the experiment configuration and the y-axis displays 
convergence time needed in seconds. The vertical bars depict the 95% confidence 
interval.  A very high increase in convergence time is obtained with comparison to the 
case for the 0.1 seconds delay of the Internet. The main reason is the large difference 
between the two values, i.e., 5 seconds and 0.1 seconds as delays. In addition, the 
increase in randomness of the 5 seconds delay5 causes higher convergence time. Due to 
large delays different BGP messages experience, the MRAI timer will be triggered adding 
another 30 seconds of delay.  
                                                      
5 Due to the use of exponential distribution which has the standard deviation equals to the mean of 5 
seconds. 
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6.2.3 Throughput 
In this section, the throughput in bits per second is studied for the two links that 
connect Router 2 to the two providers is presented. The throughput is investigated in 
both directions. A figure is provided for each application. The effect of applying the 
solution can only be seen in the throughput between Router 2 and Router 4, the good 
IISP. The throughput between Router 2 and Router 3 show the effect of blackholing on 
different network configurations. In these figures, only the mean throughput of multiple 
runs is drawn. Confidence Intervals are available but are not drawn for the purpose of 
not distracting the figure more. Refer to  Appendix B section  B.1 for baseline throughput, 
i.e. the throughput results without applying neither malicious activity nor applying 
solutions. 
Figure  6-6 shows the outgoing throughput, in bits/second, from Router 2 to Router 3 
for the HTTP application.   
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Figure  6-6 Outgoing throughput from Router 2 to Router 3 for HTTP. 
Figure  6-7 shows the throughput in bits/second for the FTP application 
configurations also from Router 2 to Router 3. 
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Figure  6-7 Throughput from Router 2 to Router 3 for FTP application 
Figure  6-8 shows the throughput in bits/second for the VOIP application 
configurations also from Router 2 to Router 3. 
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Figure  6-8 Throughput from Router 2 to Router 3 for VOIP application 
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From Figure  6-6, Figure  6-7, and Figure  6-8, it can be noticed that the traffic has the 
same pattern with close values except when the delay of the Internet is different. 
Throughput is inversely proportional to the time, and the increase of the Internet delay 
makes the throughput less. This is mainly due to TCP congestion control which slows 
down the transmission rate when the traffic experiences more delay. Referring to 
Figure  6-8, the outgoing traffic from Router 2 to Router 3 in the VOIP application with 5 
seconds delay of the Internet is shown to be less because of the slower initial time to 
converge when the delay is more. This results in postponing when the VOIP starts 
sending.  
The following set of figures shows the throughput for different applications from 
Router 3 to Router 2. Figure  6-9 shows the throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 for the 
HTTP application configuration.  
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Figure  6-9 Incoming Throughput to Router 2 from Router 3. 
Figure  6-10 shows the throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 in bits per second for 
the FTP application. The figure shows that higher throughput is exhibited when the delay 
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of the Internet is less. The delay of the Internet node affects the initial time needed for 
convergence. And also the increase of the time a packet experiences in the Internet 
reduces the rate at which the packet arrives. This results in the difference in throughput.  
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Figure  6-10 Throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 in FTP application 
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Figure  6-11 shows the throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 in the VOIP application. 
Like in the HTTP and FTP applications, a lower throughput is exhibited when the delay of 
the Internet is higher.  
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Figure  6-11 Throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 for VOIP application 
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Figure  6-6 through Figure  6-11 show that the ‘time averaged’ throughput decreases 
at time 300 because blackholing starts at this time. The solution is applied at time 360. 
The following figures show how starting a solution will enable the traffic to transfer 
through Router 4. 
The following set of figures shows the throughput from Router 2 to Router 4. 
Figure  6-12 shows the throughput from Router 2 to Router 4 in bits per second for HTTP 
application. The throughput for 0.1 delay of the Internet reaches 8500 bits per second6 
while the throughput for the 5 seconds delay stabilize at about 4000 bits per second 
which is less than half the throughput of the 0.1 delay of the Internet. Different solutions 
exhibit a similar behavior in terms of outgoing traffic through Router 4.  
                                                      
6 If it left to continue it will reach 10000 bits per second refer to Figure  B-1 in  Appendix B. 
P a g e  | 167 
 
 
 
Figure  6-12 Outgoing traffic from Router 2 to Router 4 for HTTP application. 
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Comparing Figure  6-12 to Figure  6-6, we notice that the traffic of the 0.1 seconds 
goes up to 8000 bits per second in both figures. However, for the case of the 5 seconds 
delay, the throughput goes up to about 2000 bits per second in Figure  6-6 and then goes 
down which is different than the level it reached in Figure  6-12 of 4000 bits per second. 
The reason is because of blackholing that occurs before the maximum throughput level 
reached its maximum value. This is due to the high initial convergence time needed for 
the 5 seconds delay.  Of course, the use of a time average diagram which depends not 
only on the current value causes this display. 
Figure  6-13 shows the traffic from Router 2 to Router 4 in the FTP application. In 
general, slight increase in throughput can be noticed when the load is less, and more 
throughput is expected when the delay is less. In FTP, the difference between the 0.1 
seconds delay and the 5 seconds delay cannot be seen in the figure. This is because the 
number of FTP messages are infrequent compared to HTTP messages where the inter-
request time configured is 360 seconds7. Another thing to note is that the FTP 
application for 5 seconds delay does not have time to completely establish the FTP 
                                                      
7 Look at Figure  B-3 to see that the two throughput eventually meet together at 6000 bits per second. 
However when increasing the inter-request to 60 there will be a difference between the 0.1 seconds delay 
and the 5 seconds delay as shown in Figure  B-5. 
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connection. So after the solution is applied, the FTP connection needs to be established. 
This results in additional traffic, FTP connection setup, added to the throughput. This 
analysis can be seen more clearly in Figure  6-21 where the FTP traffic received to 
LAN_East node is shown. Comparing Figure  6-13 to Figure  6-7, it can be noticed that 
there is a difference initially between the 0.1 and the 5 seconds delay of Internet. This is 
because of the slow initial convergence of the 5 seconds delay scenario. In addition, 
there is an initial setup of FTP that is needed. In case the delay of the Internet is 0.1 
seconds, the initial setup completed before the start of blackholing. However, it is not 
completed in the case where the delay of Internet is 5 seconds. Refer to Figure  6-20 and 
Figure  6-21 to see this. 
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Figure  6-13 throughput from Router 2 to Router 4 for FTP application. 
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Figure  6-14 shows the throughput from Router 2 to Router 4 for the VOIP 
application. All different application configurations coincide with each other. There is no 
difference between the 0.1 seconds delay and 5 seconds delay because VOIP is a real 
time application that runs over UDP. And UDP implements no flow control or congestion 
control. This results in a continuous sending of traffic from Router 2. 
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Figure  6-14 Throughput from Router 2 to Router 4 in VOIP application 
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Figure  6-15 shows the incoming throughput to Router 2 from Router 4 for the HTTP 
application.  
 
Figure  6-15 Incoming traffic from Router 4 to Router 2 for HTTP application.  
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Figure  6-15 shows a slight increase in the throughput for lower loads. The ratio of the 
throughput in 0.1 seconds delay of the Internet with respect to 5 seconds is about 6:5 at 
time 2000 seconds.  
Figure  6-16 shows the throughput from Router 4 to Router 3 in the FTP application 
for different solutions, load, and delay. Higher load results in lower throughput in the 
FTP.  
P a g e  | 175 
 
 
 
Figure  6-16 Throughput from Router 4 to Router 2 in FTP application. 
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The difference due to load and to Internet delay does not show in the FTP 
application, and this is similar to Figure  6-13, where the TCP congestion control is not 
triggered because of the high inter-request time.8 
Observing Figure  6-16 and Figure  6-13, it is clear that the FTP throughputs in both 
directions are similar to each other. This is because the client either downloads or 
uploads files, and by referring to Figure  A-6 in  Appendix A, it is clear that the ‘Get’ 
command (download) is 50%. So, the ‘Set’ command is the other 50%, and they should 
have similar traffic throughput. This can be contrasted with the HTTP throughput in 
Figure  6-16 and Figure  6-12 where the size of the file sent from the server to the client is 
larger; and that is why the outgoing traffic from Router 2 to Router 4 is more than the 
incoming traffic from Router 4 to Router 2. 
Figure  6-17 shows the throughput from Router 4 to Router 2 in the VOIP application. 
Increasing the load or the delay of the Internet slightly reduces the throughput.  
                                                      
8 Compare  Figure  B-2 to Figure  B-4 to see that the traffic become distinct when the interrequest time 
is reduced to 60 seconds similar to HTTP interarrival time. 
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Figure  6-17 Throughput from Router 4 to Router 2 in VOIP application. 
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     6.2.3.1   Application Level Throughput 
In this section, for different applications, figures are shown that display traffic sent 
from the LAN_East and received by LAN_East are shown. 
Figure  6-18 shows the HTTP traffic sent from the LAN_East subnet. This figure clearly 
shows that the ‘packets per second’ during the period of blackholing (300-360) reduces 
to zero.  
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Figure  6-18 HTTP Packet Sent 
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Figure  6-18 also shows lesser number of packets sent when the delay of the Internet 
is more. The packets sent are double when the delay is 0.1 in comparison with 5 second 
delay. Figure  6-19 shows the HTTP packets received by LAN_East. 
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Figure  6-19 HTTP Packet Received 
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The packets received reduce to 0 in all experiments during the period of blackholing. 
Faster recovery can be observed when the Internet delay is less. 
Figure  6-20 shows the FTP packets sent from the LAN_East subnet. The figure clearly 
shows that the number of packets sent during the time of blackholing reduces to zero.  
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Figure  6-20 FTP Packets sent from LAN_East. 
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delay of the Internet, the packets are not received until well after the recovery of 
blackholing. That is because of the nature of FTP having low number of packets in 
addition to the time needed for BGP to converge initially. By the time there is a reply, the 
blackholing starts, and when the solution is applied and network converges, it starts the 
initialization of FTP. This initialization or setup causes the initial increase of throughput 
after the solution is applied.  
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Figure  6-21 FTP Packet Received to LAN East. 
Figure  6-22 shows the VOIP packet sent from LAN_East. It is shown that the VOIP 
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over user datagram protocol (UDP).  The traffic is smooth in Figure  6-22 because this is 
the traffic sent from LAN_East and the statistic is calculated with respective to LAN_East. 
The traffic did not start experiencing the delay of the Internet node or any load. 
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Figure  6-22 VOIP Packet Sent from LAN_East 
Figure  6-23 shows the VOIP packet received by LAN_East. The figure clearly shows 
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with 5 seconds as a mean for the VOIP application results in a fluctuating behavior of the 
traffic received. This is because every packet before it is received, it experiences a 
different delay because of the higher mean and variance values of the 5 seconds delay.  
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Figure  6-23 VOIP Packet Received in LAN_East 
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Figure  6-24 shows the page response time for the HTTP application for different 
solutions, load, and delay of the Internet. 
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Figure  6-24 Page Response time for HTTP client 
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delay. Similar discussion can be conveyed on the FTP download response time shown in 
Figure  6-25. 
 
Figure  6-25 FTP download response time. 
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6.3 CASES WHEN THE SIMULATION FAILS 
In cases of having exponential delay with 5 seconds as a mean, and for the VOIP 
application, and for either 50% load or 80% load on the link, the traffic, in the simulation, 
switches back to going through the malicious router. This occurs in most of the cases 
when the link load is 50% and in all the cases when the link load is 80%. Sometimes, it 
even switches to the malicious router then switches back to the non-malicious one and 
then returns to the malicious router. This case and others are shown in Figure  6-26. 
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Figure  6-26 Packet drop in VOIP, Community Solution, exponential with 5 second delay, 80% link load 
The main reason why this occurs is because of the use of the exponential delay and 5 
seconds as mean for the delay of the Internet. In simulation, the Internet is modeled as a 
router with this specification resulting in delayed and out of order BGP messages. The 
VOIP application and high link load work as a catalyst to switch the traffic back to the 
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blackholing router. This is because the VOIP application has high traffic demand; and 
high link load causes some delay to the packets. 
By working in debugging mode and monitoring the Internet node, it can be observed 
that from the time the BGP update messages are sent, the Internet starts creating 
multiple new BGP connections with neighbors. Such a behavior does not stop until one 
of them changes its state to ESTABLISHED. As a result, the real connection with one of 
the routers changes its state to IDLE resulting in a withdraw message distributed among 
nodes in the network. Router 2 drops the routes to the destination through Router 4 and 
switches its traffic to Router 3 (the malicious router). So, this cannot be considered as a 
disadvantage of the solution, but rather a simulation related problem.    
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
BGP tuning techniques are a good way of controlling the traffic. Real time 
applications will suffer most from the packet drop period so this shall be taken into 
account by the user or designer of these applications. With the increase of Internet 
delay, the throughput is less and the packet drop is more, but no other solution from the 
solutions suggested can do better because the results are network specific and 
improvement might have to consider other protocols. 
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6.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we evaluated the performance of solving the methods using the BGP 
tuning techniques. The solution type, delay of Internet, type of application, and the load 
in terms of putting more load on specific links are the factors studied in our simulation. 
The percentage of packet drop, convergence time, throughput, application packet sent 
and received, page response time, and download response time are the metrics used in 
the evaluation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
7.1 CONCLUSION 
The goal of this thesis work is to propose, implement, and evaluate mechanisms to 
solve the problem of Internet blocking. This Internet blocking is done by a malicious IISP 
that isolates a local region by blackholing its traffic and announcing capabilities to deliver 
the traffic to its intended destination. Only BGP based solutions are considered.  
In order for the application to work, the traffic in both directions should not pass 
through the malicious node. Therefore, both the incoming and outgoing traffic for a 
single application must be controlled to pass through the good IISP. Controlling the 
incoming traffic is more complex than controlling the outgoing traffic, because 
controlling the outgoing traffic is a local decision while controlling the incoming traffic 
involves influencing the traffic in the Internet to come through the good IISP. 
The thesis proposes three techniques to solve the problem, namely BGP tuning, 
virtual peering and virtual transit. It provides a qualitative comparison between them 
also. The thesis then describes the design, implementation, and validation of BGP tuning 
techniques. A performance evaluation is provided of BGP tuning techniques. The 
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performance is conducted in terms of type of solution, Internet delay, application type, 
and load. BGP convergence time, throughput, packet drop, and response time are the 
metrics used for comparison.  
7.2 FUTURE WORK 
The implementation of virtual peering and virtual transit is going to be the next step 
of this research. Then these methods can be compared with BGP tuning methods. Virtual 
peering and virtual transit might take longer time to converge because of the setup 
needed. These techniques, however, provide more deterministic control of traffic in 
addition to the identity hiding employed by tunneling.   
This work can be extended by applying these techniques in real life scenarios to test 
their effect on the Internet. Real case scenarios can give better results in terms of traffic 
blocked, applications that succeeded to work, and other related issues. One can also 
relax the assumption of having only one provider being malicious. Multiple IISPs in the 
path might be malicious and the problem then could be how to avoid them. Also, one 
can look at what if the provider analyzes traffic inside the tunnel and drops the packets. 
Some encryption might be needed. Detection of malicious activities in all of these 
scenarios is also important for future research.  
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Appendix A  
APPLICATION CONFIGURATION 
In order to make it easy to interpret some results, we show in this section the 
configurations needed for each protocol of interest. The configurations of TCP, HTTP, FTP 
and VOIP are shown. The configuration of each application is shown. And also the 
default parameters of OPNET are used in our experiments. 
A.1 TCP CONFIGURATION 
Figure  A-1 shows the TCP configuration used. 
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Figure  A-1 TCP Configuration. 
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A.2 HTTP CONFIGURATION 
Figure  A-2 shows the configuration of HTTP application. The page Interarrival time is 
exponentially distributed with mean 60 seconds. More over the HTTP version used is 
HTTP 1.1. 
 
Figure  A-2 HTTP Configuration. 
Figure  A-3 shows the properties of an HTTP page. Each page has five medium sized 
images in addition to 1000 bytes page size.  
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Figure  A-3 HTTP Page Properties. 
Figure  A-4 shows the size of the image properties. Medium image has a uniform 
distribution between 500 and 2000 bytes. So, its mean is 1750 bytes. The average page 
size is 1000 + 5 * 1750 = 9750 bytes. 
 
Figure  A-4 Size of Image. 
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The server selection is shown in Figure  A-5. The number of pages per server is 
exponentially distributed with mean 10 pages. 
 
Figure  A-5 HTTP Server Selection. 
A.3 FTP CONFIGURATION 
Figure  A-6 shows the FTP configuration used. The interarrival time is exponentially 
distributed with mean 360 seconds. The Get command is 50% of total commands. That 
means that 50% for the ‘Set’ command. The file size is 50000 bytes.  
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Figure  A-6 FTP Configuration. 
A.4 VOIP CONFIGURATION 
Figure  A-7 shows the VOIP configurations used. The encoding scheme is GSM FR and 
there is one voice frame per packet. The compression and decompression delays are 
both 0.02 seconds. 
P a g e  | 205 
 
 
 
Figure  A-7 VOIP Configuration. 
The silence length configuration is shown in Figure  A-8. Both incoming and outgoing 
are exponentially distributed with mean 0.65 seconds. 
 
Figure  A-8 Silence Length configuration. 
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The talk spurt length is shown in Figure  A-9. Both incoming and outgoing talk spurt 
length is exponentially distributed with a mean of 0.352 seconds. 
 
Figure  A-9 Talk Spurt Length. 
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Appendix B  
BASELINE THROUGHPUT AND APPLICATION TRAFFIC 
In this appendix a set of baseline figures are shown. These figures are for the runs of 
throughput and application traffic presented in  CHAPTER 6. Basically, these figures are 
simple run of different application for different loads (20%, 50%, and 80%) and for 
different Internet delay (0.1 second and 5 seconds) without the intervention of malicious 
blackholing and application of solution. The presentation of these figures will help the 
thesis reader see the behavior of the traffic in case the traffic goes normally without any 
change. And as a result, it helps in strengthening the understanding of why specific 
traffic behaves in certain way.  
B.1 BASELINE THROUGHPUT 
In throughput the traffic pass normally between Router 2 and Router 3. So in this 
section, only throughputs between Router 2 and Router 3 in both directions are shown.  
Figure  B-1 shows the throughput from Router 2 to Router 3 for HTTP application. 
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Figure  B-1 Baseline HTTP throughput from Router 2 to Router 3. 
Figure  B-2 shows the throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 for HTTP application. 
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Figure  B-2 Baseline HTTP Throughput from Router 3 to Router 2. 
Figure  B-3 shows the baseline throughput for FTP from Router 2 to Router 3. 
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Figure  B-3 Baseline FTP throughput from Router 2 to Router 3. 
Figure  B-4 shows the Baseline throughput for FTP from Router 3 to Router 2. 
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Figure  B-4 Baseline FTP throughput from Router 3 to Router 2. 
Figure  B-5 shows the FTP throughput from Router 2 to Router 3 when the Inter-
request time is 60 seconds. The figure shows the case when just the load is 20%. 
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Figure  B-5 baseline throughput for FTP application, inter-request is 60. 
Figure  B-6 shows the baseline FTP throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 when the 
inter-request time is 60 seconds. The figure shows the traffic when the load is just 20%. 
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Figure  B-6 Baseline FTP throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 when the inter-request is 60 
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Figure  B-7 shows the baseline throughput for VOIP application from Router 2 to Router 3. 
 
Figure  B-7 Baseline VOIP throughput from Router 2 to Router 3. 
  
Figure  B-8 shows the baseline throughput from Router 3 to Router 2 for VOIP 
application. 
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Figure  B-8 Baseline VOIP throughput from Router 3 to Router 2. 
 
B.2 BASELINE APPLICATION TRAFFIC 
In this section the application level traffic sent from or received by LAN_East are shown 
in the case when there is no malicious blackholing or any solution is applied. 
Figure   B-9 shows the baseline HTTP traffic sent from LAN_East. 
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Figure   B-9 Baseline HTTP traffic Sent of LAN_East. 
Figure  B-10 shows the baseline HTTP traffic received by LAN_East. 
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Figure  B-10 Baseline HTTP Traffic Received in LAN_East. 
Figure  B-11 shows the FTP traffic sent by LAN_East. 
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Figure  B-11 Baseline FTP Traffic Sent in LAN_East. 
Figure  B-12 shows the baseline FTP traffic received by LAN_East. 
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Figure  B-12 Baseline FTP Traffic Received in LAN_East. 
Figure  B-13 shows the baseline VOIP traffic sent by LAN_East. 
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Figure  B-13 Baseline VOIP Traffic Sent from Router 2 to Router 3. 
Figure  B-14 shows the baseline VOIP traffic received by LAN_East. 
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Figure  B-14 Baseline VOIP Traffic Received in LAN_East. 
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Appendix C  
CODE CHANGE 
C.1 CHANGES IN BGP MODULE 
C.1.1 Changes in bgp Process 
As shown in section  CHAPTER 5section  5.5.2 that a number of states are added as 
shown in Figure  C-1. 
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Figure  C-1 Location of modifications in bgp process 
C.1.1.1 State Variables 
In state variable the scheduled_reconfiguration state is added 
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Figure  C-2 Schedule Reconfiguration state variable addition 
C.1.1.2 Changes in Header Block 
Code Snippet  C-1 shows the definitions of conditions to move to added states. 
 
 
 
Code Snippet  C-2 shows the definition of Timed_Policy structure to store 
information to schedule BGP reconfiguration. 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
#define RECONFIGURE (intrpt_type == OPC_INTRPT_SELF) &&(intrpt_code >= 0) 
#define CONFIN     (isIn == OPC_TRUE) 
#define CONFOUT     (isIn == OPC_FALSE) 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-1 Definitions of conditions in header block. 
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Code Snippet  C-3 shows the definition of the method that reads the policy from the 
user configuration. The parameter int addr_family_attr_id is added.  
 
 
 
 
C.1.1.3 Modifications in function block 
The method bgp_neighbor_policy_info_read is modified, the definition of the 
function is shown in Code Snippet  C-4.  
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/*structure for storing scheduled route maps*/ 
typedef struct Timed_Policy{ 
 IpT_Rte_Policy* rte_policy_ptr; 
 double time; 
 int neighbor_as; 
 Boolean isIn; 
 Boolean isMoreSpecific; 
 BgpT_Mp_Prefix* prefix_ptr; 
 List*   mp_prefixes_list; 
}Timed_Policy; 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-2 Definition of Timed_Policy in Header Block 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
static void bgp_neighbor_policy_info_read (Objid 
ith_neighbor_info_id, List** incoming_update_pib_ptr, List** 
outgoing_update_pib_ptr, int neighbor_as_number, int 
addr_family_attr_id, const char* vrf_name); 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
Code Snippet  C-3 Definition of modified policy read method 
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Code Snippet  C-5 shows the added local variables to 
bgp_neighbor_policy_info_read function. 
 
 
 
 
Code Snippet  C-6 shows the allocation of memory for Timed_Policy inside 
bgp_neighbor_policy_info_read function. 
 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
IpT_Rte_Policy*  rte_policy_ptr; 
 Timed_Policy*  a_timed_policy; 
 BgpT_Update_Dir  direction; 
 double    time; 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
static void 
bgp_neighbor_policy_info_read (Objid ith_neighbor_info_id, List** 
incoming_update_pib_ptr, List** outgoing_update_pib_ptr, int 
neighbor_as_number, int addr_family_attr_id, const char* vrf_name) 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
Code Snippet  C-4 Modification of Definition of Reading Policy Function 
Code Snippet  C-5 Local Variables Added to Read Policy Function. 
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Code Snippet  C-7 shows the read of the time of applying the time 
 
 
 
 
Code Snippet  C-8 shows the code of storing Timed_Policy in 
Rescheduled_Configuration. 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/* Read the policies and insert them into appropriate lists */ 
for (count_j = 0; count_j < num_applicable_policies; count_j++) 
{ 
a_timed_policy = (Timed_Policy*) op_prg_mem_alloc 
(sizeof(Timed_Policy)); 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/* Read the policies and insert them into appropriate lists */ 
/* Obtain the applicable direction.      */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_policy_info_id, "Applicable Direction", 
&direction); 
    
/* Obtain the time        */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_policy_info_id, "time", &time); 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-6 Allocating Memory to Timed_Policy Variable 
Code Snippet  C-7 Reading the Time 
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are modified as shown in Code Snippet  C-9. 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/* Store the route map into into the list of route maps */ 
if (direction == BgpC_Update_Dir_In) 
 { 
 if(time == 0.0) 
  { 
  /* Insert the route map into incoming update PIB */ 
  /* in the same order as they appear in the table */ 
op_prg_list_insert (incoming_update_pib, rte_policy_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  } 
 else 
  { 
  a_timed_policy->rte_policy_ptr = rte_policy_ptr; 
  a_timed_policy->time = time; 
  a_timed_policy->neighbor_as = neighbor_as_number; 
  a_timed_policy->isIn = OPC_TRUE; 
  a_timed_policy->isMoreSpecific = OPC_FALSE; 
  printf("time should not be zero %d\n", (int)a_timed_policy-
>time); 
  op_prg_list_insert (scheduled_reconfigurations, 
a_timed_policy, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
      
  } 
 } 
else 
 { 
 if(time == 0.0) 
  { 
  /* Insert the route map into incoming update PIB    */ 
  op_prg_list_insert (outgoing_update_pib, rte_policy_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  } 
 else 
  { 
  a_timed_policy->rte_policy_ptr = rte_policy_ptr; 
  a_timed_policy->time = time; 
  a_timed_policy->neighbor_as = neighbor_as_number; 
  a_timed_policy->isIn = OPC_FALSE; 
  a_timed_policy->isMoreSpecific = OPC_FALSE; 
  op_prg_list_insert (scheduled_reconfigurations, 
a_timed_policy, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  } 
 } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-8 Storing timed Policy in Scheduled Reconfiguration 
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Code Snippet  C-9 shows the call of bgp_neighbor_policy_info_read inside 
bgp_nbr_addr_family_params_read. 
 
 
 
Code Snippet  C-10 shows the creation of scheduled_reconfiguration list defined in 
the function bgp_sv_init () in the function block. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/* Read routing policy information. */ 
bgp_neighbor_policy_info_read (addr_family_id, &incoming_update_pib, 
 &outgoing_update_pib,  bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_as_number, 
addr_family_attr_int, vrf_name); 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-9 Modified use of reading policy function in bgp_nbr_addr_family_params_read function 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/* Initialization of scheduled reconfiguration list in */ 
/* order to store any timed_policy to be conducted in  */ 
/* the middle of simulation     */ 
 scheduled_reconfigurations = op_prg_list_create (); 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-10 Creation of reconfiguration list done in bgp_sv_init 
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C.1.1.4 Reconfigure state 
Code Snippet  C-11 shows the code of Reconfigure state. In this state the 
timed_policy is accessed to know which   
 
 
 
C.1.1.5 ReconfigIn State 
Code Snippet  C-12, Code Snippet  C-13, and Code Snippet  C-14 show the code of 
ReconfigureIn State. In this state, the child process is called to handle the ‘rib-in’ 
database, modify them in order to control the outgoing traffic.  
 
 
 
  
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
a_timed_policy = 
(Timed_Policy*)op_prg_list_access(scheduled_reconfigurations , intrpt_code); 
isIn = a_timed_policy->isIn; 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-11 Reconfigure State Code 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
In this state we need to get the Bgp_Conn_Info caused the interrupt, and 
invoke the corresponding child, pass to the child the corresponding route 
map that need to be changed, [the child should modify rib in if any change 
happen] so if there any change the route chosen as best we need to update 
local rib, routing tables and propagate to neighbor    **/ 
     
num_entries = op_prg_list_size(bgp_connections_list_ptr); 
for(count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++ ) 
{ 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr = op_prg_list_access (bgp_connections_list_ptr, 
count_i); 
 if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_as_number == a_timed_policy-
>neighbor_as) 
  break; 
 } 
op_pro_invoke (bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_prohandle,  a_timed_policy-
>rte_policy_ptr); 
     
/* If the packet contained unreachable destinations, they have to be  */ 
/* removed from the Loc-RIB.            */ 
if (bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists == OPC_TRUE) 
 { 
 /* Get the list of unreachables routes form the mailbox area.*/ 
 unreachability_list_ptr = bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>unreachable_rte_list_ptr; 
 if (ip_node_is_pe (ip_module_data_ptr) &&  
  (bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name != OPC_NIL)) 
  bgp_prefix_list_ipv4_to_vpnv4_convert (unreachability_list_ptr, 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name); 
      
 /* Process the information and re-set the flag.           */ 
 bgp_unfeasible_routes_process (unreachability_list_ptr, 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->peer_id);  
/* Make sure that the flag is reset to false so that the next set of*/ 
  /* unfeasible routes can be properly communicated.       */ 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists = OPC_FALSE; 
 } 
else 
 { 
 /* Force the unreachability list pointer to be NULL. This value  */ 
 /* will be passed to the procedure that will propagate the new */ 
 /* status of the Local-RIB to all the neighbors.                 */ 
 unreachability_list_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 } 
 /* Check to see if new routes have been added to the RIB-In */ 
 
Code Snippet C-12 ReconfigureIn Code
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
if (bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->num_new_routes > 0) 
{ 
 /* Collect the new routes from the temporary list into the new */ 
 /* routes list.        */ 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr-
>num_new_routes; count_i++) 
  { 
 /* All new routes should be on top of the list. Access the  */ 
 /* the new routes and add them to the list.    */ 
 new_rte_entry_ptr = (BgpT_Rte_Entry*) op_prg_list_remove 
(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr, OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD);  
 /* Set the admin distance on the new routes.    */ 
 if (BgpC_Conn_Type_Ebgp == bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_type) 
  { 
  new_rte_entry_ptr->admin = admin_distance; 
  } 
 else 
  { 
  new_rte_entry_ptr->admin = ibgp_admin_distance; 
  }     
 /* Check if this new entry is from a VPN site    
 */ 
if (ip_node_is_pe (ip_module_data_ptr) &&  
  (bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name != OPC_NIL)) 
  { 
  /* Check if this new entry is from a VPN site. And RD and  */ 
  /* values are not set for this route. If it is  */ 
  /* then set the route distinguisher value for the entry  */ 
 bgp_new_rte_at_vpn_pe_process (new_rte_entry_ptr, bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>neighbor_site_vrf_name); 
  }    
op_prg_list_insert (new_rte_list_ptr, new_rte_entry_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD)
 /* Continue till all the new routes have been inserted.  */ 
 } 
 /* Call the procedure that will process the new routes.  */
 bgp_reachability_info_process (bgp_conn_info_ptr);   
 /* Reset the number of new routes to 0 and destroy the temporary */ 
 /* list.         */ 
 bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->num_new_routes = 0; 
 op_prg_mem_free (bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr); 
     } 
 
/* Find out the number of new routes that were entered into the local  */ 
/* routing table. This would not only be the number of routes that  */ 
/* that were received as a part of the advertisement, but also could */ 
/* contain the replacement routes that were selected after certain  */ 
/* routes were termed infeasible.       */ 
number_of_new_routes = op_prg_list_size (new_rte_list_ptr); 
Code Snippet  C-13 Continue ReconfigureIn Code 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
     
/* If any of the list is valid, then all the peer processes have to  */ 
/* be notified about the change in the routing table status.       */ 
if ((number_of_new_routes > 0) || unreachability_list_ptr != OPC_NIL) 
{ 
/* Unless this is a dummy node representing an external AS,   */ 
/* propagate the new routes to all the other neighbors.   */ 
if (OPC_FALSE == is_external_as_node) 
 { 
bgp_new_routes_propagate (unreachability_list_ptr, number_of_new_routes, 
    bgp_conn_info_ptr->peer_id); 
 } 
     
/* Clean up just the new_rte_list_ptr by removing all the route  */ 
/* entries in it. Be sure not to free up the memory of the   */ 
/* route entries as these entries are used by the route tables.  */ 
for (count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; count_i++) 
{ 
 /* remove the routes entries from the new route list.   */ 
op_prg_list_remove (new_rte_list_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
} 
     
/* Clean up the unreachble routes list. The prefixes in this list */ 
/* can be freed up. The will not be reference by any route entry. */ 
if (unreachability_list_ptr != OPC_NIL) 
{ 
/* Destroy the list of unreachable routes.*/ 
bgp_support_rte_list_destroy (unreachability_list_ptr); 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_list_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
} 
} 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
Code Snippet C-14 Continue ReconfigureIn Code
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C.1.1.6 ReconfigOut State 
 
 
  
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
num_entries = op_prg_list_size(bgp_connections_list_ptr); 
for(count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++ ) 
{ 
bgp_conn_info_ptr = op_prg_list_access (bgp_connections_list_ptr, count_i); 
if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_as_number == a_timed_policy->neighbor_as) 
 break; 
} 
rte_list_ptr = bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->rte_list_ptr; 
num_entries = op_prg_list_size (rte_list_ptr); 
new_rte_list_ptr = op_prg_list_create(); 
if (! a_timed_policy->isMoreSpecific) 
{ 
for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++) 
 { 
 rte_entry_ptr = (BgpT_Rte_Entry*) op_prg_list_access (rte_list_ptr, 
count_i); 
 new_rte_entry_ptr = bgp_support_rte_entry_copy(rte_entry_ptr); 
 rte_maps = op_prg_list_create(); 
 op_prg_list_insert(rte_maps, a_timed_policy->rte_policy_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
 if(bgp_support_rte_filter_policy_apply(&new_rte_entry_ptr, rte_maps, 
OPC_NIL, OPC_NIL, OPC_FALSE, &policy_edited,  
  bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_type, bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>local_info_ptr) == OPC_TRUE) 
  { 
  if (policy_edited == OPC_TRUE) 
   { 
   //bgp_support_rte_entry_print(rte_entry_ptr); 
   new_mp_prefix_ptr = (BgpT_Mp_Prefix*) 
bgp_support_mp_prefix_copy(rte_entry_ptr->dest_prefix_ptr); 
   bgp_support_ith_rte_entry_replace (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>adj_rib_out_ptr, count_i, new_rte_entry_ptr); 
   op_prg_list_insert (new_rte_list_ptr, new_rte_entry_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
   } 
  } 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
 else 
  { 
  /* Restrict this route.      */ 
  bgp_support_rte_entry_destroy (new_rte_entry_ptr); 
   
  /* Update the statistics that indicate the number   */ 
  /* routes that were dropped due to route policies.  */ 
  op_stat_write (bgp_conn_info_ptr->local_info_ptr-
>bgp_local_stats.num_policy_discards_local_stat_hndl, 1.0); 
  op_stat_write (bgp_conn_info_ptr->local_info_ptr-
>bgp_local_stats.num_policy_discards_local_stat_hndl, 0.0); 
  } 
 } 
if (ip_node_is_pe (ip_module_data_ptr) &&  
 (bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name != OPC_NIL)) 
 bgp_prefix_list_ipv4_to_vpnv4_convert (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>unreachable_rte_list_ptr, bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_site_vrf_name); 
           
   
number_of_new_routes = op_prg_list_size (new_rte_list_ptr); 
//bgp_support_rte_table_print(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr); 
 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->new_routes_lptr = op_prg_list_create(); 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes = 0; 
for(count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; count_i++) 
 { 
 op_prg_list_insert(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr-
>new_routes_lptr,  
 bgp_support_rte_entry_copy((BgpT_Rte_Entry*) 
op_prg_list_access(new_rte_list_ptr, count_i)), OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
 } 
Code Snippet  C-16 Continue ReconfigureOut Code 
P a g e  | 236 
 
 
 
  
 /* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes = 
op_prg_list_size(new_rte_list_ptr); 
if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes > 0 || 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->unreachable_rte_exists == OPC_TRUE) 
 { 
 op_pro_invoke (bgp_conn_info_ptr->bgp_connection_prohandle, OPC_NIL); 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; count_i++) 
  { 
else 
{ 
/* Here we want to handle more specific prefixes*/ 
/* read the prefix and the number of bits to divide*/ 
/* search for it in rib out      */ 
/* if found store route attribute */ 
/* divide it into list of prefixes */ 
/* create the route with the same path attribute of rib out */ 
/* add the routes to rib out */ 
/* send it to the specific neighbor by invoking the process!! */ 
 
mp_prefix_ptr = a_timed_policy->prefix_ptr; 
rte_entry_ptr = bgp_support_rte_entry_find (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>adj_rib_out_ptr, mp_prefix_ptr, &location); 
if (rte_entry_ptr != OPC_NIL) 
 { 
 num_prefixes = op_prg_list_size (a_timed_policy->mp_prefixes_list); 
 if (num_prefixes > 0) 
  { 
  bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->new_routes_lptr = 
op_prg_list_create(); 
  bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes = 0; 
  for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_prefixes; count_i++) 
   { 
   new_mp_prefix_ptr = op_prg_list_access (a_timed_policy-
>mp_prefixes_list, count_i); 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
   new_rte_entry_ptr = 
bgp_support_rte_entry_copy(rte_entry_ptr); 
   new_rte_entry_ptr->dest_prefix_ptr = new_mp_prefix_ptr; 
   op_prg_list_insert(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr-
>new_routes_lptr, new_rte_entry_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
 
  if(bgp_conn_info_ptr->adj_rib_out_ptr->num_new_routes > 0) 
   { 
   op_pro_invoke (bgp_conn_info_ptr-
>bgp_connection_prohandle, OPC_NIL); 
   for (count_i = 0; count_i < number_of_new_routes; 
count_i++) 
    { 
    // remove the routes entries from the new route 
list.    
    op_prg_list_remove (new_rte_list_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_HEAD); 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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C.1.2 Modification in bgp_conn Process 
The modification of bgp_conn are done in two locations inside ESTABLISHED state 
and in the function block. 
C.1.2.1 Established State 
In order to handle the self interrupt in the established state the code shown in Code 
Snippet  C-19 is added. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start*/ 
case OPC_INTRPT_SELF: 
 { 
 if (intrpt_code >= 0) 
  { 
  rte_policy_ptr = (IpT_Rte_Policy*) op_pro_argmem_access (); 
   
  if (rte_policy_ptr == OPC_NIL) 
   { 
   bgp_conn_new_route_indication_handle (); 
   } 
  else 
   { 
   bgp_conn_apply_map_rib_in (rte_policy_ptr); 
   } 
  }          
 /* The Hold timer has expired or the parent node has failed  */ 
 /* Move to the IDLE state.      */ 
 break; 
 } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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C.1.2.2 Function Block 
Code Snippet  C-20 and Code Snippet  C-21 show the definition of 
bgp_conn_apply_map_rib_in. This function apply the scheduled map on the rib-in 
database. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
static void bgp_conn_apply_map_rib_in (IpT_Rte_Policy* rte_policy_ptr) 
 { 
 List* rte_maps; 
 Boolean edit_status; 
 List* rte_list_ptr; 
 BgpT_Rte_Entry* rte_entry_ptr; 
 BgpT_Rte_Entry* new_rte_entry_ptr; 
 int   num_entries; 
 int   count_i; 
 /* what needed to be done 
 1. loop the rib in    2. copy each entry 
 3. apply policy       4. if accepted process the new route 
 */ 
 FIN(bgp_conn_apply_map_rib_in (rte_policy_ptr)); 
 rte_list_ptr = bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->rte_list_ptr; 
 num_entries = op_prg_list_size (rte_list_ptr); 
 bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr = op_prg_list_create (); 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_entries; count_i++) 
  { 
  rte_entry_ptr = (BgpT_Rte_Entry*) op_prg_list_access 
(rte_list_ptr, count_i); 
  new_rte_entry_ptr = bgp_support_rte_entry_copy(rte_entry_ptr); 
 /* because the method of applying policy only accept list of policies 
   we need to create a list and insert rte_policy_ptr to it.*/ 
  rte_maps = op_prg_list_create(); 
  op_prg_list_insert(rte_maps, rte_policy_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
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C.1.3 Shortening 
For shortening, a change in the file bgp_support.ex.c 
bgp_support_as_path_prepend is to add the calling of the method that do the 
shortening bgp_support_as_path_remove_first. This is shown in Code 
Snippet  C-22. 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
  if(bgp_support_rte_filter_policy_apply(&new_rte_entry_ptr, 
rte_maps, OPC_NIL, OPC_NIL, OPC_TRUE, &edit_status, BgpC_Conn_Type_None, 
conn_info_ptr->local_info_ptr) == OPC_TRUE) 
   { 
   if(edit_status) 
    { 
    bgp_conn_route_entry_process(new_rte_entry_ptr); 
    } 
   } 
  else 
   { 
    //bgp_conn_previously_advertised_route_check 
(new_rte_entry_ptr->dest_prefix_ptr); 
    //bgp_support_rte_entry_destroy (new_rte_entry_ptr); 
   } 
  } 
 if (bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->num_new_routes == 0) 
  op_prg_mem_free (bgp_my_adj_rib_in_ptr->new_routes_lptr); 
 FOUT; 
 } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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The function bgp_support_as_path_remove_first is shown in Code 
Snippet  C-23, Code Snippet  C-24. 
 
  
/* Alrefai Code Snippet start */ 
static void bgp_support_as_path_prepend (BgpT_Path_Attrs* path_attrs_ptr, 
const IpT_Rte_Map_AsPath_List* as_list_ptr) { 
    int*    new_segment_value_array; 
    int                 as_seg_index; 
    int                 as_list_index; 
    int                 seg_length; 
    BgpT_Path_Segment*  path_segment_ptr; 
 /** Prepend the ASes specified in the list to the AS Path. **/ 
 FIN (bgp_support_as_path_prepend (path_attrs_ptr, as_list_ptr)); 
  
 if (0 == as_list_ptr->num_as_numbers) 
  { 
   bgp_support_as_path_remove_first(path_attrs_ptr); 
  FOUT; 
  } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start*/ 
void 
bgp_support_as_path_remove_first (BgpT_Path_Attrs* orig_path_attrs_ptr) 
    { 
 int*    new_segment_value_array; 
    int                 ith_elem; 
    int                 seg_length; 
    BgpT_Path_Segment*  ith_path_segment_ptr; 
/** This function the last AS added to the first place of the list **/ 
    FIN (bgp_support_as_path_remove_first (orig_path_attrs_ptr)); 
    ith_path_segment_ptr = (BgpT_Path_Segment *) 
  op_prg_list_access (orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_list_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
 /* Find the length of the segment value.  */ 
    seg_length = ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length; 
 if(seg_length <= 1) 
 { 
  //printf("I am changing the the segment insider"); 
  ith_path_segment_ptr = bgp_support_path_seg_mem_alloc (); 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_type = 
BgpC_Path_Seg_Type_As_Sequence; 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length = 0; 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array = OPC_NIL; 
  op_prg_list_remove (orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_list_ptr, 
OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  op_prg_list_insert (orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_list_ptr, 
ith_path_segment_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
 } 
 else 
 { 
  /* The memeber segment value is a array of AS numbers. Copy */ 
  /* that into a new array.                                   */ 
  new_segment_value_array = (int*) prg_cmo_alloc 
(bgp_as_path_list_cmh, (seg_length-1)*sizeof (int)); 
  
    /* Done with adding. Exit the function           */ 
    FOUT; 
    }/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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but this method needs to be defined in bgp_support_defs.h file as shown below 
  
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
  for (ith_elem = 0; ith_elem < seg_length; ith_elem++) 
  { 
  } 
  /* Copy the elements of the original array into new array.  */ 
  for (ith_elem = 1; ith_elem < seg_length; ith_elem++) 
      { 
         new_segment_value_array [ith_elem - 1] = 
ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array [ith_elem]; 
         } 
  /* Free up the Old segment value array.    */ 
  if (seg_length > 0) 
   op_prg_mem_free (ith_path_segment_ptr-
>segment_value_array); 
  /* set the new value and increment the segment length. */ 
  ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_value_array = 
new_segment_value_array; 
  (ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length)--; 
  seg_length = ith_path_segment_ptr->segment_length; 
 } 
 --orig_path_attrs_ptr->as_path_length; 
    /* Done with adding. Exit the function           */ 
    FOUT; 
    } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
void bgp_support_as_path_remove_first (BgpT_Path_Attrs* 
orig_path_attrs_ptr); 
 /* End Code Snippet*/ 
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C.1.4 More Specific Prefixes 
Changes are done in the function block. 
The bgp_nbr_addr_family_params_read function is changed; lines of code 
shown in are added. 
 
 
 
This method is added bgp_neighbor_more_specific_prefix_read is 
shown in  
 
 
 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/****************************************************************/ 
/* More SPecific Prefixes      */  
/****************************************************************/ 
/* Read scheduled more specific prefixes */ 
bgp_neighbor_more_specific_prefix_read (addr_family_id, addr_family, 
bgp_conn_info_ptr->neighbor_as_number); 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
static void  
bgp_neighbor_more_specific_prefix_read (Objid ith_neighbor_info_id, 
InetT_Addr_Family addr_family, int neighbor_as_number) 
 { 
 Objid     msp_objid; 
 Objid    jth_msp_info_id, jth_prefix_info_id; 
 Objid    prefix_id; 
 Objid    first_prefix_id; 
 Objid    prefixes_id; 
 int     num_msps; 
 int     count_i, count_j; 
 char    addr_str[64]; 
 InetT_Address   ntwk_addr, masked_ntwk_addr; 
 InetT_Subnet_Mask inet_smask; 
 IpT_Address   ipv4_smask; 
 BgpT_Ip_Prefix*  prefix_ptr; 
 int     num_prefixes; 
 double    time; 
 Timed_Policy*  timed_policy_ptr; 
 BgpT_Mp_Prefix*  mp_prefix_ptr; 
  
 FIN (bgp_neighbor_more_specific_prefix_read (ith_neighbor_info_id, 
addr_family)); 
  
 op_ima_obj_attr_get (ith_neighbor_info_id, "More Specific Prefix", 
&msp_objid); 
 num_msps = op_topo_child_count (msp_objid, OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
 if (num_msps > 0) 
  { 
  timed_policy_ptr = (Timed_Policy*) op_prg_mem_alloc 
(sizeof(Timed_Policy)); 
  timed_policy_ptr->isIn = OPC_FALSE; 
  timed_policy_ptr->isMoreSpecific = OPC_TRUE; 
  timed_policy_ptr->mp_prefixes_list = op_prg_list_create(); 
  } 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_msps; count_i++) 
  { 
  jth_msp_info_id = op_topo_child (msp_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, count_i); 
   
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_msp_info_id, "Prefix", &prefix_id); 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
  first_prefix_id = op_topo_child (prefix_id, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_prefix_id, "IP Address", 
addr_str); 
  ntwk_addr = inet_address_create (addr_str, addr_family); 
  if (!inet_address_valid (ntwk_addr)) 
{bgp_invaid_network_address_log_write (count_i, addr_str); continue;} 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_prefix_id, "Mask", addr_str); 
  if (InetC_Addr_Family_v4 == addr_family) 
   {if (0 == strcmp (addr_str, 
BGPC_SUBNET_MASK_AUTO_ASSIGN_STR)) 
    {ipv4_smask = ip_default_smask_create 
(inet_ipv4_address_get(ntwk_addr));} 
   else{ipv4_smask = ip_address_create (addr_str); 
    if (ip_address_equal (IPC_ADDR_INVALID, 
ipv4_smask)) 
     {bgp_invaid_subnet_mask_log_write 
(count_i, addr_str);continue;}} 
   inet_smask = inet_smask_from_ipv4_smask_create 
(ipv4_smask); 
   } 
  else{continue;} 
  masked_ntwk_addr = inet_address_mask (ntwk_addr, 
inet_smask); 
  inet_address_destroy (ntwk_addr); 
  prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_mem_alloc (); 
  *prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_create_fast 
(masked_ntwk_addr, inet_smask); 
  mp_prefix_ptr = 
bgp_support_mp_prefix_from_ip_prefix(prefix_ptr); 
  timed_policy_ptr->prefix_ptr = 
bgp_support_mp_prefix_copy(mp_prefix_ptr); 
   
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_msp_info_id, "Prefixes", 
&prefixes_id); 
  num_prefixes = op_topo_child_count (prefixes_id, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
  for (count_j = 0; count_j < num_prefixes; count_j++) 
   { 
   jth_prefix_info_id = op_topo_child (prefixes_id, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, count_j); 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_prefix_info_id, "IP 
Address",addr_str); 
  ntwk_addr = inet_address_create (addr_str, addr_family); 
  if (!inet_address_valid (ntwk_addr)) 
{bgp_invaid_network_address_log_write (count_j, addr_str); continue;} 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_prefix_info_id, "Mask", addr_str); 
   if (InetC_Addr_Family_v4 == addr_family) 
    {if (0 == strcmp (addr_str, 
BGPC_SUBNET_MASK_AUTO_ASSIGN_STR)) 
     {ipv4_smask = ip_default_smask_create 
(inet_ipv4_address_get(ntwk_addr));} 
    else{ipv4_smask = ip_address_create (addr_str); 
     if (ip_address_equal (IPC_ADDR_INVALID, 
ipv4_smask)) 
      {bgp_invaid_subnet_mask_log_write 
(count_i, addr_str);continue;}} 
   inet_smask = inet_smask_from_ipv4_smask_create 
(ipv4_smask); 
   } 
   else{continue;} 
   masked_ntwk_addr = inet_address_mask (ntwk_addr, 
inet_smask); 
   inet_address_destroy (ntwk_addr); 
   prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_mem_alloc (); 
   *prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_create_fast 
(masked_ntwk_addr, inet_smask); 
   mp_prefix_ptr = 
bgp_support_mp_prefix_from_ip_prefix(prefix_ptr); 
   op_prg_list_insert (timed_policy_ptr-
>mp_prefixes_list, mp_prefix_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
    
   } 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (jth_msp_info_id, "Time", &time); 
  timed_policy_ptr->time = time; 
  timed_policy_ptr->neighbor_as = neighbor_as_number; 
  op_prg_list_insert (scheduled_reconfigurations, 
timed_policy_ptr, OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  } 
 FOUT; 
} 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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C.2 MODIFICATION IN IP PROTOCOL 
C.2.1 IP Dispatch Process 
In ip_rte_support.h file, the structure IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From is 
defined as shown in Code Snippet  C-29.This structure used to specify the prefixes to 
blackhole and the time to start blackholing. 
 
 
 
 
 
This structure is included in another structure that is generally accessible by IP 
processes. The structure is IpT_Rte_Module_Data and the addition is shown in 
Code Snippet  C-30. 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/*structure to specify a list of prefixes and time to start blackholing*/ 
typedef struct IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From 
 { 
 //add here statistic to store the number of packets 
 int number_of_packets; 
 //add here statistic to store the number of blackholed traffic 
 int number_of_blackholing; 
 double time; 
 List * prefixes; 
 }IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From; 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
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C.2.1.1 Function Block 
The function ip_dispatch_init_phase_2 is modified to include local variables 
shown in Code Snippet  C-31 and to read the configuration of More Specific Prefixes as 
shown in Code Snippet  C-32. 
 
 
 
  
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
Objid     malicious_blackholing_objid; 
Objid     first_blackholing_objid; 
Objid     prefixes_objid; 
Objid     ith_prefix_objid; 
int     num_blackholing; 
int     num_prefixes; 
IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From*  blackhole_from_ptr; 
double     time; 
List*     prefixes; 
char     addr_str[64]; 
InetT_Address    ntwk_addr, masked_ntwk_addr; 
InetT_Subnet_Mask   inet_smask; 
IpT_Address    ipv4_smask; 
int     count_i; 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
typedef struct IpT_Rte_Module_Data 
 { 
 Objid      module_id; 
 Objid      node_id; 
 /* Omitted other definitions*/ 
IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From*   blackhole_from_ptr; 
  /* Added by Ahmad Salam Alrefai to inidicate time and 
prefixes to block*/   
 } IpT_Rte_Module_Data; 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
Code Snippet  C-30 Adding IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From to IpT_Rte_Module_Data. 
Code Snippet  C-31 Local variables added to ip_dispatch_init_phase_2. 
P a g e  | 250 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/* read malicious blackholing information */ 
op_ima_obj_attr_get(module_data.ip_parameters_objid, "Malicious 
Blackholing", &malicious_blackholing_objid); 
num_blackholing = op_topo_child_count (malicious_blackholing_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
if (num_blackholing > 0) 
 { 
 first_blackholing_objid = op_topo_child (malicious_blackholing_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, 0); 
 op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_blackholing_objid, "Time", &time); 
 op_ima_obj_attr_get (first_blackholing_objid, "Prefixes", 
&prefixes_objid); 
num_prefixes = op_topo_child_count (prefixes_objid, OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC); 
 prefixes = op_prg_list_create (); 
 for (count_i = 0; count_i < num_prefixes; count_i++) 
  { 
  ith_prefix_objid = op_topo_child (prefixes_objid, 
OPC_OBJTYPE_GENERIC, count_i); 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (ith_prefix_objid, "IP Address", addr_str); 
 ntwk_addr = inet_address_create (addr_str, InetC_Addr_Family_v4); 
if (!inet_address_valid (ntwk_addr)) {printf("network invalid"); continue;} 
  op_ima_obj_attr_get (ith_prefix_objid, "Mask", addr_str); 
  ipv4_smask = ip_address_create (addr_str); 
  if (ip_address_equal (IPC_ADDR_INVALID, 
ipv4_smask)){printf("network invalid");continue;} 
  inet_smask = inet_smask_from_ipv4_smask_create (ipv4_smask); 
  masked_ntwk_addr = inet_address_mask (ntwk_addr, inet_smask); 
  inet_address_destroy (ntwk_addr); 
  prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_mem_alloc (); 
  *prefix_ptr = inet_address_range_create_fast (masked_ntwk_addr, 
inet_smask); 
  op_prg_list_insert (prefixes, prefix_ptr,OPC_LISTPOS_TAIL); 
  } 
 blackhole_from_ptr = op_prg_mem_alloc (sizeof 
(IpT_Rte_Blackhole_From)); 
 blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_packets = 0; 
 blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing = 0; 
 blackhole_from_ptr->time = time; 
 blackhole_from_ptr->prefixes = prefixes; 
 module_data.blackhole_from_ptr = blackhole_from_ptr; 
 } 
else 
 { 
 module_data.blackhole_from_ptr = OPC_NIL; 
 } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-32 Modifying ip_dispatch_init_phase_2 to Read Values for More Specific Prefix Configuration. 
P a g e  | 251 
 
 
C.2.1.2 The ip_rte_central_cpu Process 
In ip_rte_central_cpu the method 
ip_rte_central_cpu_packet_arrival is modified as shown in Code 
Snippet  C-33 to define local variable and in Code Snippet  C-34 to call 
ip_rte_blackhole_traffic function. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
Boolean      is_blackholed; 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
result = ip_rte_packet_arrival (module_data_ptr, 
  &pkptr, instrm, &intf_ici_fdstruct_ptr, &rcvd_iface_info_ptr); 
 /*Alrefai start modification*/ 
is_blackholed = ip_rte_blackhole_traffic (module_data_ptr, pkptr); 
if (result == OPC_FALSE || is_blackholed == OPC_TRUE) 
/*@End of modification*/ 
{ 
  /* Packet was dropped in call */ 
FOUT; 
} 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
Code Snippet  C-33 Adding Local Variable to ip_rte_central_cpu_arrival function. 
Code Snippet  C-34 Calling ip_rte_blackhole_traffic function from inside ip_rte_central_cpu_packet_arrival. 
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C.2.1.3 Blackholing Definition and Implementation 
The method ip_rte_blackhole_traffic definition is shown in Code 
Snippet  C-35. It is defined in the file ip_rte_support.h. 
 
 
 
In ip_rte_support.ex.c the function ip_rte_blackhole_traffic is 
implemented as shown in  
  
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
/** Ahmad Salam Alrefai Method!! ***/ 
Boolean ip_rte_blackhole_traffic (IpT_Rte_Module_Data * iprmd_ptr, 
Packet * pkptr); 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
/* Alrefai Code Snippet Start */ 
Boolean ip_rte_blackhole_traffic (IpT_Rte_Module_Data * iprmd_ptr, Packet * 
pkptr) 
 { 
 InetT_Address_Range *  blackholed_prefix; 
 InetT_Address     dest_address; 
 InetT_Address     src_address; 
 int num_prefixes; 
 IpT_Dgram_Fields* pk_fd_ptr; 
 double time; 
 List * prefixes; 
 int count_i; 
 FIN (ip_rte_blackhole_traffic (iprmd_ptr,pkptr)); 
 if (iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr == OPC_NIL) 
  { 
  FRET (OPC_FALSE); 
  } 
 iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_packets++; 
  time = iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->time; 
Code Snippet  C-35 Definition of ip_rte_blackhole_traffic. 
Code Snippet  C-36 The implementation of ip_rte_blackhole_traffic_function. 
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/* Alrefai Code Snippet Continue… */ 
if (op_sim_time() < time) 
  { 
  FRET (OPC_FALSE); 
  } 
 prefixes = iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->prefixes; 
 op_pk_nfd_access (pkptr, "fields", &pk_fd_ptr); 
 dest_address = pk_fd_ptr->dest_addr; 
 src_address = pk_fd_ptr->src_addr; 
 num_prefixes = op_prg_list_size(prefixes); 
 printf("number of packets: %d \n",iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr-
>number_of_packets); 
 for(count_i = 0; count_i < num_prefixes; count_i++) 
  { 
  blackholed_prefix = (InetT_Address_Range *)op_prg_list_access 
(prefixes, count_i); 
  if (inet_address_range_check (dest_address, blackholed_prefix) 
== PRGC_TRUE) 
   { 
   ip_rte_dgram_discard (iprmd_ptr, pkptr, op_pk_ici_get 
(pkptr), "Discarded because destination address is blackholed:)"); 
   iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing++; 
 
   printf("number of blackholing: %d \n", iprmd_ptr-
>blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing); 
   FRET (OPC_TRUE); 
   } 
  else if (inet_address_range_check (src_address, 
blackholed_prefix) == PRGC_TRUE) 
   { 
   ip_rte_dgram_discard (iprmd_ptr, pkptr, op_pk_ici_get 
(pkptr), "Discarded because source address is blackholed:)"); 
   iprmd_ptr->blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing++; 
   printf("number of blackholing: %d \n", iprmd_ptr-
>blackhole_from_ptr->number_of_blackholing); 
   FRET (OPC_TRUE); 
   } 
  } 
 FRET (OPC_FALSE); 
 } 
/* End Code Snippet*/ 
 
Code Snippet  C-37 The implementation of ip_rte_blackhole_traffic_function. 
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Appendix D  
MANUAL TO RUN THE WORK 
D.1 PROCEDURE 
1. Install OPNET version 14.5. By default OPNET is installed in “C:\Program Files” 
directory, and a folder called OPNET is created that contains all the files.  
 
Figure  D-1 OPNET installation Folder 
2. Therefore, the default [OPNET DIRECTORY] is “C:\Program Files\OPNET”. 
3. Go to [OPNET DIRECTORY]\ 14.5.A\models\std. 
4. Keep a backup of the folders bgp, ip, include, as shown in  
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Figure  D-2 Modified Folders 
5. Replace those folders by our modified bgp, ip, and include folders. 
6. The default [OPNET PROJECTS] is C:\Documents and Settings\[USER 
NAME]\op_models as shown 
 
Figure  D-3 op_models folders 
7. Put the project folder asr_bgp_experiments5.project in [OPNET PROJECTS] 
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8. Start OPNET Application and open asr_BGP_experiments5.prj inside the folder 
asr_bgp_experiments5.project. 
Then you can run the simulation and generate any result you want. 
Another method, instead of replacing the bgp, ip folders one can just put them in 
local directory, and then run any process from bgp and from ip, this causes OPNET to ask 
whether you want to overwrite the path  and you should answer yes, use these modified 
bgp and ip instead and as a result causing OPNET to read the modified ip and bgp 
protocols. Include folder still needs to be overridden, however. 
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